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INTRODUCTION
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug
signals certification of the drug’s safety and efficacy for
specified purposes, at the dosing level, and for the duration of
use examined during the agency’s approval process. Some
estimates, however, indicate that over half of the prescription
medications provided to patients in the United States may be
prescribed for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose, over a
longer period of time, or for a population (such as children)
different from that for which the drug has been approved. 1
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1. David Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1025 (2006) (estimating that
approximately 21% of prescriptions overall in the medical office setting were
off-label solely in terms of the indication or purpose for which the medication
was prescribed, although some categories of medications—specifically, cardiac
medications and antihismatics for allergies—had much higher rates,
approaching or exceeding 50%). Off-label prescribing of medications for
psychiatric conditions appears to be higher than that for other medical
conditions. Id.; see Hua Chen et al., Off-Label Use of Antidepressant,
Anticonfulxant, and Antipsychotic Medications Among Georgia Medicaid
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This common practice, called “off-label” prescribing, has raised
significant concerns over the safety and efficacy of medications
prescribed outside the scope of their FDA approval. 2 A study
published in the Archives of Internal Medicine in May, 2006,
sharpened these questions when it reported that “most” offlabel prescriptions studied had “little or no scientific support.” 3
Concerns over the effectiveness or even the safety of such offlabel prescribing are significant for individual patients, for
private and public health care budgets, and for the public
health. The advent of the Medicare prescription drug benefit 4
has intensified the interest in the phenomenon of off-label
prescribing and in the relationships between the
pharmaceutical industry and practicing physicians. 5
Enrollees in 2001, 67 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 972, 975 (2006) (“75% of
antidepressant recipients and 80% of anticonvulsant recipients received at
least one of these medications off label.”); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Off-Label
Prescribing, http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/articles/bioethics/ (last
visited Oct. 2, 2006) (“[E]stimates [of off-label prescribing] run as high as 60%
of all drug prescriptions in the United States in a given year.”); David M.
Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient? Why the FDA Needs
to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech From Drug Manufacturers on OffLabel Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 315, 356 n.219 (2005)
(“One estimate indicated off-label use accounted for 40–50% of the $216 billion
spent on U.S. prescription drugs in 2003.”); cf. Megan Barnett, The New Pill
Pushers: Big Pharma Watches Lawsuit Over ‘Off-Label’ Prescription Drug
Marketing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 26, 2004, at 40 (“An estimated 23
percent of prescriptions are written for off-label uses.”).
2. Radley, supra note 1, at 1021.
3. Id.
4. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (expanding Medicare to cover
prescription drugs for beneficiaries).
5. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million
to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label
Promotion (May 13, 2004), available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/
04_civ_322.htm (quoting the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services that fraud litigation directed at off-label marketing and
prescribing “sends a strong message in advance of the implementation of the
Medicare prescription drug benefit that our first priority will be protecting
beneficiaries and the programs that serve them”); Nicole Huberfeld, Pharma
on the Hot Seat, 40 J. HEALTH L. 241, 253 (2007) (“Direct reimbursement by
Medicare [through Part D] means that the DOJ will have many more
opportunities to regulate the industry through enforcement of the federal
False Claims Act.”); see also Gardiner Harris, U.S. Weighs Not Paying for All
Uses of Some Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at C1 (“Federal Medicare
officials are close to deciding whether to refuse for the first time to pay for
unapproved uses of expensive cancer drugs.”).
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Actions taken to constrain off-label prescribing in response
to these increasing concerns, however, face a serious risk of
error. Counterintuitively, efforts to categorically restrict offlabel prescribing will harm individual patients, who will be
denied medication that may be uniquely effective though not
yet definitively proven so, and seriously reduce medical
innovation and “field discovery” 6 of important therapeutics.
Questions concerning the exercise of medical judgment in
off-label prescribing certainly reflect rational concerns for
individual patients, but these questions also raise significant
public policy issues relating to oversight of medical decision
making. Thus far, the dominant public policy response to the
phenomenon of off-label prescribing practices addresses the
issue as a particular breed of financial conflicts of interest in
medicine.
This view constructs a narrative of off-label prescribing
that sees the financial relationships between pharmaceutical
firms, practicing physicians, and researchers as a corrupting
influence that pollutes medical judgment. The conflicts-ofinterest narrative of off-label prescribing may mistakenly lead
to an assumption that removing the confounding financial selfinterest of doctors will itself result in better prescribing
practices.
It may be assumed that in such a purer
environment, off-label prescribing will be more rational,
meaning evidence-based, relying on research and information
that will be produced and disseminated without the
involvement of the pharmaceutical firms.
At best, the conflicts-of-interest narrative is only a partial
6. The off-label use of Neurontin, the subject of the litigation discussed
in Part III of this article, for neuropathic pain associated with shingles was
approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) in 2002 after years of offlabel use for this purpose. See infra note 232 and accompanying text. Other
notable examples of effective, expanded uses discovered in the context of
prescribing for off-label uses include the use of beta blockers for preventive
care post heart attack; the use of Viagra for erectile dysfunction; and the use
of AZT for AIDS. Jason K. Gross, Compliance Counsel and ‘Off-Label’ Issues,
N.J. L.J., July 24, 2006, available at http://www.sillscummis.com/newsroom;
Stephen R. Solbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate
Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79
B.U. L. REV. 93, 99–102 (1999); see also Harold J. DeMonaco et al., The Major
Role of Clinicians in the Discovery of Off-Label Drug Therapies (Mass. Inst.
Tech., Sloan Working Paper No. 4552-05, 2006), available at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/529167 (defining “field discovery” as the
new applications of drugs that are discovered through “clinical practice that
[is] independent of pharmaceutical company or university research”).
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accounting of the phenomenon of off-label prescribing. At
worst, the conflict-of-interest explanation of off-label
prescribing, standing alone, will mislead regulators because it
relies on untenable assumptions regarding the production and
diffusion of clinical knowledge. In either case, the conflicts-ofinterest model cannot contribute to serious efforts to
prospectively and substantively control off-label prescribing.
Efforts to address off-label prescribing solely as a matter of
conflicts of interest may be important and may have some
positive benefits, but, inevitably, public and private regulators
will be left with the conundrum that the conflicts-of-interest
approach dodges: off-label prescribing decisions usually operate
in the face of serious gaps in research and knowledge. 7 Efforts
to seriously restrict this prescribing practice will operate
without a firm evidentiary foundation for such limitations and,
thus, will struggle with whether particular incidences or
patterns of off-label prescribing are “correct,” in terms of
effectiveness and an individualized and appropriate riskbenefit analysis for the individual patient. 8 Furthermore,
strident efforts to eliminate certain pharmaceutical industry
behaviors that create conflicts of interest may exacerbate this
knowledge gap by both depressing the production of clinical
research and its assimilation into medical practice.
This paper argues that the core problem in off-label
prescribing is not the relationship between the pharmaceutical
industry and doctors, or at least not entirely so. Rather, the
prevalence of off-label prescribing is a manifestation both of
learning patterns in the medical profession and deficiencies in
the production and dissemination of clinical knowledge.
Furthermore, the fraud and abuse litigation strategy currently
7. Radley, supra note 1, at 1021; see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE 160
(2006) (stating that a restriction on pharmaceutical companies’ involvement in
prescribing will likely cause a reduction in the information available for new
drugs).
8. In fact, there is a significant gap in most research regarding the
industry influences on physician prescribing behavior. The studies that
identify the direction of the influence (i.e., increasing prescribing or request for
inclusion in formularies) do not identify whether the change in prescribing
produces better outcomes or otherwise benefits patients. Paul H. Rubin, An
Uncertain Diagnosis, REG. Summer 2005 at 34, 35; EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at
160. See generally Thomas P. Stossel, Regulating Academic-Industrial
Research Relationships—Solving Problems or Stifling Progress?, 353 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1060 (2005). See discussion infra text accompanying note 26.
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pursued by the federal government in response to industryprescriber interactions around off-label prescribing buries the
essential problem in a conflicts-of-interest framework.
Part I of this article analyzes the impact of off-label
prescribing patterns upon the market demand for postapproval clinical trials. This Part concerns itself with how
physicians learn and how these learning patterns depress the
production of new clinical knowledge concerning drugs that
have already been approved for release to the market and thus
are available for off-label prescribing. Post-approval trials,
usually called post-marketing or Phase IV trials, are critical to
public health because of limitations in the testing performed
during the drug approval process. 9 In spite of the value of
Phase IV clinical trials, regulatory requirements for postapproval trials are nearly non-existent at this point; 10 and the
physician-prescriber market exerts only a weak demand for the
production of clinical research on approved drugs. Although
demands for trials may be strengthening among other players
in the health care market, the physician-prescriber market is
likely to remain the core determinant of the volume of this
research.
Part II of this article examines the character, quality and
volume of clinical research and its limited usefulness for
individual prescribing decisions as well as current deficiencies
in the production of clinical knowledge that impede efforts by

9. See infra text accompanying notes 72–73. The FDA approval process
for a new drug requires clinical trials of the drug to test its safety and
effectiveness. Generally, these trials proceed in three phases. Phase I trials
test the metabolic and pharmacological behaviors of the medication in a small
group of human subjects, typically between twenty and eighty persons, and
are focused primarily on assessing the risks of the drugs. Testing then
proceeds to Phase II in which the drug is tested on a larger group of subjects
(generally 100 to 300 individuals) and on persons with the particular disease
or condition to which the medication is directed. Phase III trials generally are
the largest of the trials conducted prior to approval of a drug. Phase III trials
usually require 1,000 to 3,000 subjects. Trials that are conducted after or
concurrently with the approval of the drug are usually called Phase IV trials.
See W. Christopher Matton & F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance:
Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 283, 298–302 (2004)
(briefly describing the FDA’s drug approval process, including clinical trials);
Office of Inspector General, HHS, Recruiting Human Subjects: Pressures in
Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, OEI-01-97-00195, June 2000, at 12
(“An average of 4,237 subjects were used in New Drug Applications from 1994
to 1995, compared with an average of 1,321 subjects from 1981 to 1984.”).
10. See discussion infra notes 23–24.
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gatekeepers or regulators to move doctors, either by incentive
or penalty, toward a stronger reliance on scientific proof of
efficacy for off-label prescriptions. This Part also identifies a
relationship between established patterns of physician learning
and the character of contemporary clinical research by
demonstrating how efforts to control conflicts of interest in
research, especially through disclosure, reinforce skepticism
toward scientific research on the part of practicing physicians.
Finally, this article examines litigation efforts targeted at
financial relationships between doctors and pharmaceutical
firms relating to off-label prescribing, focusing on federal
litigation under the False Claims Act over one particular drug,
Neurontin. This prosecution produced a settlement of over
$455 million and has spawned a significant body of similar
litigation efforts. 11 Part III uses the Neurontin litigation, and
its aftermath, to highlight the limitations of the conflicts-ofinterest dominated approaches to controlling off-label
11. It remains the largest settlement to date for litigation focusing solely
on the marketing, educational, and research activities of a pharmaceutical
firm relating to off-label prescribing. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, WarnerLambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care
Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004), available at
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm. Since that settlement, the
government has aggressively pursued pharmaceutical firms for these
activities, winning significant settlements. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rost
v. Pfizer, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Mass. 2006) (regarding off-label use of human
growth hormone.); Julie Schmit, Schering-Plough to Pay $435 Million
Settlement, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 2006, at 1B (reporting settlement of
government claims of fraud for promotion of off-label uses leading to the
submission of both false claims against Medicaid as well as pricing violations);
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million
Relating to Off-Label Promotion (Dec. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/05_civ_685.html (“Eli Lilly and
Company agreed to plead guilty and to pay $36 million in connection with its
illegal promotion of its pharmaceutical drug Evista.”); see also Robert Brady et
al., Crackdown on “Off-Label” Pitches, NAT’L. L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at S1
(reporting on the settlements of actions against Serono, among other cases, for
off-label promotion of a drug to treat AIDS wasting, as well as other cases).
Pharmaceutical companies have also filed suit over off-label promotion by
competitors. See, e.g., Off-Label Use: Zeneca, Maker of Nolvadex, Sues Eli
Lilly for Claiming Evista Prevents Breast Cancer, 8 BNA-HEALTH L. REP. 392
(1999) (“Zeneca Group PLC . . . seeks to prohibit Lilly . . . from continuing to
market a rival product—Evista—that has not been approved by the Food and
Drug Administration.”). The impact of the False Claims Act litigation for offlabel promotion has also triggered private products liability class actions and
suits by private insurers to claim payments made for prescriptions for the
drug. See infra notes 222–223 and accompanying text.
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prescribing and to illustrate the information constraints that
challenge efforts to regulate off-label prescribing more directly.
Although the Neurontin litigation and similar cases are
frequently proffered as an illustration of the centrality of
conflicts of interest in the relationships among the
pharmaceutical industry, researchers and doctors, this
litigation is more richly studied for what it reveals about the
nature of clinical knowledge and clinical judgment. The
litigation and its aftermath, including the persistence of offlabel prescribing of Neurontin, the subsequent approval of
certain off-label uses of the drug, and the unsuccessful attempt
of the Florida Medicaid program to restrict Neurontin
prescribing, also raise questions about the limited impact of
this type of litigation on prescribing patterns and illustrate the
significant gap between controlling pharmaceutical-prescriber
relations through civil and criminal litigation and transforming
that effort into prospective, substantive control over
prescribing. In addition, viewing the issues addressed in this
article through the lens of the Neurontin litigation grounds the
analysis in today’s reality of inadequate clinical research and
limited efforts to disseminate new learning. As off-label
prescribing attracts more attention, it is critical that efforts to
constrain the practice not outpace the information and
dissemination resources that currently exist. 12
12. The advent of the electronic medical record and the resultant large
population databanks promise lower-cost post-approval research as the
records can be mined for evidence of adverse effects as well as efficacy for offlabel prescriptions. Unfortunately, serious information problems will remain
even in the brave new information world. The data may be seriously
inadequate for assessing health outcomes and may be inaccurate. Both the
databank and the resultant analysis may be proprietary to the payer. Finally,
problems in creating adequate space for clinical innovation; access to
unproven but effective interventions; and the translation of averages to the
individual patient will persist. See generally James Walker, Electronic
Medical Records and Health Care Transformation, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1118
(2005); Clifford Goodman, Savings in Electronic Medical Record Systems? Do
It For the Quality, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1124 (2005). One illustration of potential
public-private information partnerships is the newly established partnership
between the larger managed care organizations (MCOs) and federal agencies,
including both the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and
the FDA, which to this point focus almost solely on drug safety issues. See
Kristin Madison, ERISA and Liability for Provision of Medical Information, 84
N.C. L. REV. 471, 502–04 (2006) (calling for effective accountability for MCOs
as medical information providers. Whether or not these concerns about the
usefulness of the research constructed from the aggregation of patient records
turn out to be well founded, these data sets are only now emerging).
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PART I: WEAK DEMAND FOR POST-MARKETING
CLINICAL RESEARCH
Despite the extraordinary potential value of postmarketing clinical research for approved drugs—in terms of
enhancing continuing safety surveillance as well as
encouraging broader testing on the effectiveness of medications
for both approved and unapproved purposes—the demand for
post-marketing studies is quite weak. A number of factors
converge to diminish demand for such research. As discussed
below, the legal framework for drug approval and drug
prescribing encourages narrow approvals and results in broad
off-label prescribing.
In addition, prescribing physicians
themselves do not demand continuing research on approved
drugs in part because of learning patterns that tend to
minimize the impact of published studies and formal
continuing medical education.
State law generally creates a relatively neutral
environment for off-label prescribing. State liability standards,
for example, generally do not place the physician at
significantly increased risk of liability for off-label prescribing
per se. Doctors are not subject to strict liability for prescribing
a medication off-label. In fact, off-label use often becomes the
customary standard of care in particular circumstances, with
the result that doctors are at risk for malpractice liability for
failure to prescribe an approved drug for an off-label use.
Furthermore, liability standards typically allow a doctor to
engage in off-label prescribing as a matter of “clinical
innovation,” as distinguished from “experimentation” (which
triggers heightened regulatory standards for informed consent),
in attempting to treat individual patients. 13 Nor does state
malpractice law generally require specific disclosure by the
physician to the patient that the particular prescribed use is
off-label,
although
products
liability
suits
against
pharmaceutical manufacturers related to marketing of off-label
uses have seen some success. 14
13. FDA, “Off-label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics,
and Medical Devices, 1998 Update, GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REV.
BOARDS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS & SPONSORS, available at http://www.fda.
gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/offlabel.html (noting that IRB review and Investigational New
Drug Application is not required).
14. Mehlman, supra note 1 (providing an overview of liability risks for off-
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The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 15 specifically
provides that the FDA has no authority to “limit or interfere
with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or
administer any legally marketed [medical] device to a patient
for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care
practitioner-patient relationship.” 16 While the Act does not
include a parallel provision for drugs, the FDA adheres to an
identical policy for physician prescribing 17 of approved
medications including prescribing that differs in indication,
population, dose or duration from those approved by the FDA. 18
The intention of this policy is to avoid federal interference with
the practice of medicine, 19 a somewhat quaint notion at this
point but alive in this situation nonetheless. 20
Federal drug law, however, does more than merely permit

label prescribing, but noting that in Richardson v. Miller the “court held that
the fact that a drug use was off-label could be introduced as evidence that the
prescribing physician deviated from the standard of care”); see Richardson v.
Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Pharmaceutical firms have been
found liable for injuries related to off-label uses when they have actively
promoted those uses and concealed adverse effects. Proctor v. Davis, 682
N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1997); see also Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent:
Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 967 (2007); Bernadette Tansey, Hard Sell: How Marketing
Drives the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Patient’s Right to Know: How Much
Should Doctors Disclose About Treatments Not Approved by the FDA?, S.F.
CHRON., May 1, 2005, at A1.
15. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2000).
17. The FDA, however, does regulate pharmaceutical firms’ behavior in
relation to promoting off-label uses. The FDA prohibits pharmaceutical firms
from marketing drugs for off-label uses, but allows companies to engage in
limited educational and research efforts related to off-label prescribing. The
limitations on firm behavior in relation to promotion of off-label uses are
discussed in Part III below, in the context of the Neurontin litigation.
18. See 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (Aug. 15, 1972); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 67,44001 (Dec. 30, 1991). More recently, the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act loosened FDA restrictions on the dissemination of
information on unapproved uses of approved drugs by pharmaceutical firms to
physicians. Pub. L. No. 105-115 § 401, 11 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA,
Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions,
53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71 (1998).
19. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349–51 (2001)
(specifically commenting on the benefits of off-label prescribing of medical
devices and the restrictions on the FDA’s authority to interfere).
20. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling
the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 192 (2004).
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off-label prescribing. 21 The operation of the FDCA encourages
the proliferation of off-label uses. Because a drug approved for
a particular purpose is then available to the prescribing
physician for any purpose, the regulatory structure incentivizes
pharmaceutical firms to seek a narrow approved use, at least
initially, in order to minimize the delay to market and reduce
the investment in research required to meet FDA standards for
The FDA only rarely requires post-approval
approval. 22
clinical trials as a condition of approval, 23 and the agency’s
21. Of course, the federal government has other interests regarding offlabel prescriptions, and perhaps countervailing policies and authority as the
largest purchaser of drugs. As will become apparent in the later discussion of
the Neurontin litigation, these interests have not operated as a significant
counterweight to the incentives in the FDCA regulatory structure. See infra
text accompanying notes 238–270.
22. Mitchell Oates, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment Through
Production and Disclosure of Research Into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1280 (2005).
23. The FDA has had authority to require post-marketing clinical trials in
two circumstances: first, if the drug was approved under the fast-track
provision for getting drugs to market in the case of life-threatening diseases;
second, in the rarest cases where testing a drug on human beings is unethical,
the FDA requires testing when circumstances make such testing feasible and
ethical. 21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.610(b)(1) (2002). In
addition, the FDA may require post-marketing clinical trials where testing is
needed to assure that particular drugs used by a substantial number of
children are safe and effective for pediatric use. 21 U.S.C. 355(c) (2000). The
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), described
below, reauthorized the Pediatric Research Equity Act which is the source of
this provision and appears to have significantly expanded the pediatric
assessment required at submission for approval of a new drug. Pub. L. No.
110-85 § 302, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.). Current FDA regulations do provide for post-marketing surveillance,
requiring that the manufacturer report any new information concerning safety
and efficacy periodically. These regulations, however, do not require that the
drug be submitted to formal clinical trials, but may lead to a reevaluation of
the drug’s approval. FDA, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research,
Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/
applications/Postmarketing/surveillancepost.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006); see
also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, THE FUTURE OF
DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 155–
56 (2007) (“FDA’s statutory authority to require postmarketing studies has
been a subject of debate for decades.”). On September 27, 2007, President
Bush signed the FDAAA to take effect on October 1, 2007. Pub. L. No. 110-85,
121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The
FDAAA expands the authority of the FDA to require post-approval trials, but
only where justified by “new safety information.” Id. § 801(a). This may be a
significant expansion in terms of post-approval drug safety surveillance, but it
does not reach the bulk of clinical research required to guide prescription of
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follow up on required trials has been lax. 24 Incentives to invest
in expanded approval 25 are uneven at best. 26
off-label uses. In addition, the FDAAA establishes a new process in which the
FDA may require at initial approval or thereafter that a drug with “serious
adverse drug experience” requires a “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies” (REMS) plan through which the drug would be monitored to
assure that the benefits continue to outweigh risks. Id. § 901(a). Again, this
can be an important addition to drug surveillance and safety, but does not
respond to the broader need for post-approval clinical trials addressed in this
article. The FDA is required to issue regulations under this provision by fall,
2009, so the impact of this provision is unlikely to be felt for some time. Id. §
9019(a); see also Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use
of Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 695 (2006) (suggesting that the FDA has frequently
negotiated a requirement of postapproval studies with pharmaceutical firms
in the absence of clear authority to require them).
24. A 2006 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) study
reported that generally the agency’s post-marketing surveillance system
suffered from a lack of clarity, insufficient oversight, and a lack of clear
criteria for decisions. In addition, the GAO criticized the FDA’s follow up on
post-marketing trials that it had required. GAO, IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN
FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 36 (Mar.
2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf. The problems
extend to medical device issues as well as pharmaceuticals. See FDA Briefing
Addresses Problems in Medical Device Postmarket Surveillance System,
KAISER DAILY HEALTH POL’Y REP., Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www.
kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=35193.
The
FDAAA strengthened post-marketing adverse event surveillance in several
respects. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-85, FDAAA § 402 (requiring that all
adverse event reports received within one year of a labeling change for
pediatric use be forwarded to the FDA’s Office of Pediatric Therapeutics); id. §
502(a) (requiring that all adverse events be reported by the applicant where
pediatric studies are being conducted under the reauthorized Best
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act); id. § 901(a) (requiring Risk Evaluation and
Mitigation Strategies).
25. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70; Oates, supra note 22, at 1285 (describing
burdensomeness of supplemental approval process).
26. See, e.g., Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109,
115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (creating incentives for testing approved children’s
drugs, by, in part, increasing patent protections for those drugs).
Congress reauthorized this Act as Title V of the FDAAA and expanded the
market exclusivity earned by firms that engage in such research. The
intersection of patent law with the FDCA diminishes incentives for seeking
approval of expanded uses of an approved drug. In the context of Neurontin,
for example, it is possible that approval of expanded uses was not sought
because of the anticipated expiration of the patent protection of the drug.
Department of Justice, supra note 5. Revenue from sales of Neurontin fell
77% when patent protection expired. Hoover’s In-Depth Company Records,
Pfizer, Inc. 2 (Mar.7, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 4302915. The FDCA
limitation on promotion of approved drugs for off-label uses targeted to
physician-prescribers could create an incentive for seeking approval, but
ordinarily does not do so. See infra discussion accompanying notes 28–29. The
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Of course, the market could provide incentives for
continuing research on approved drugs despite weak regulatory
mandates. If physicians in practice refused to prescribe drugs
beyond the use, duration, population or dosage for which they
have been approved, firms would be incentivized by the
prescriber market to seek broader approval expeditiously. The
frequency and breadth of off-label prescribing, however, provide
strong inferential evidence that doctors do not regard FDA
approval as a necessary indicator of effectiveness (e.g., when
they prescribe for an unapproved use) and perhaps even safety
(e.g., when they prescribe at unapproved dosages or durations
or for significantly distinct populations on which the drug has
not been tested). In view of the serious constraints of the
formal approval process, at least in terms of the time lag and
the capacity of the FDA, a practice of awaiting formal approval
for each indication is impractical, may harm patients, and
actually may violate the standard of care in particular
circumstances. The practice of off-label prescribing, then,
would seem to be a rational reaction to the limitations of the
formal approval process. 27
While prohibiting off-label prescribing by requiring formal
FDA approval for every indication, dose, duration of therapy,
and population for which an approved drug may be prescribed
is impractical, practicing doctors could instead, as a general
rule, refrain from prescribing medications until they are at
least proven effective and safe, even if not formally approved,
for the particular prescription contemplated. One may argue
that the practice of medicine, to the extent that it relies on a
scientific model of knowledge, would demand no less than
substantial proof of safety and effectiveness prior to off-label
prescribing. If doctors did so, pharmaceutical firms would
confront a strong market demand for post-marketing clinical

emergence of pre-emption of state products liability claims, for drugs that are
prescribed as approved, may create an incentive for seeking formal approval of
expanded uses, but it is too early to tell. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical
Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J.
623 (2007).
27. Some have suggested that these limitations in the drug approval
process argue in favor of dismantling the entire system. See, e.g., Daniel B.
Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?, REGULATION, June 1,
2004, at 60–62.
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trials, 28 and the weakness of the regulatory requirements for
post-marketing research would become less significant.
Practicing physicians, in fact, do not exert a high demand
for convincing scientific proof of effectiveness for off-label uses.
Nor do they create a robust market for scientifically valid
On what
information on effectiveness or even safety. 29
information, then, do doctors rely in making prescribing
decisions for off-label uses?
The conflicts-of-interest narrative of off-label prescribing
implies that doctors’ willingness to prescribe is simply
purchased by the pharmaceutical industry through free
lunches, office supplies, travel, speaker’s fees, and other more
extravagant gifts. 30 While the “doctor for sale” story may be
28. Of course, doctors are not the only gatekeepers for prescribed drugs.
Most health plans and pharmaceutical benefit management programs,
however, currently do little to confine off-label prescribing, although they are
actively engaged in efforts to influence physician and patient demand on other
fronts, including, for example, shifting from expensive to less expensive
substitute formulations (“fail first” requirements), switching to generic drugs,
creating tiered benefits or increased co-pays, requiring preauthorization, or, in
the case of Medicaid programs, simply limiting the number of prescription
drugs that will be reimbursed for each patient. Stephen B. Soumerai, Benefits
and Risks of Increasing Restrictions on Access to Costly Drugs in Medicaid, 23
HEALTH AFF. 135 (2004) (describing these methods); J.D. Kleinke, Access
Versus Excess: Value-Based Cost Sharing for Prescription Drugs, 23 HEALTH
AFF. 34, 42 (2004) (noting that the private insurance sector has “mostly
abandoned” the “command-and-control . . . and other first-generation
management strategies” for pharmaceuticals); see Rachel Christensen Seithi,
Prescription Drugs: Recent Trends in Utilization, Expenditures, and Coverage,
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF No. 265 (Jan. 2004), available at
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0104ib.pdf (reporting on a general decline in
the number of employers using substantive controls). But see Peter J.
Neumann, Emerging Lessons from the Drug Effectiveness Review Project, 25
HEALTH AFF. 262 (2006). Consumer behavior can also create an incentive for
postmarketing research and formal approval of an already approved drug for
an off-label indication as FDA approval for the off-label use is required if the
firms want to advertise directly to consumers. Direct-to-consumer (DTC)
advertising of prescription medications increases requests by patients for
specific prescriptions, but there is a large gap between request and
prescribing. While one survey found that approximately 35% of patients had
discussed an advertised drug with their doctor, a 2002 GAO study reported
that only 5% of consumers had both requested and received a prescription for
a particular drug that had been the subject of DTC advertising. GAO, FDA
OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 4 (Oct.
2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03177.pdf.
29. Radley, supra note 1, at 1021.
30. Troyen A. Brennan et al., A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to
Physicians From Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252–53 (2003); Ashley Wazana,
Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283
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true as far as it goes, 31 a fuller appreciation of physician
prescribing behavior requires examining how physicians
actually learn to alter their practices, in this case to establish a
new prescribing pattern for particular medical conditions.
The literature on physician learning belies the common
view of the practice of medicine as bounded by science. In fact,
one student of physician learning observed that doctors “have a
deep skepticism about clinical trials, from a belief that clinical
experience, rather than the scientific evidence should govern
clinical practice.” 32 High valuation of experience 33 over studies
permeates the observed learning patterns of practicing
physicians, including the surprisingly limited influence of
published studies and the relative ineffectiveness of didactic
continuing medical education.
Peer-reviewed journals are the gold standard for the
publication of rigorous medical and scientific research; and
journal articles do exert some influence on specific treatment
decisions, but not nearly as much as one might anticipate. One
researcher on physician decision making, for example, has
noted that “the universal skepticism of practicing physicians
regarding the utility of the scientific literature is startling.” 34
JAMA 373, 373 (2000).
31. See discussion of lack of outcomes research in the conflicts of interest
literature supra note 7.
32. Rebecca K. Schwartz et al., Physician Motivations for Nonscientific
Drug Prescribing, 28 SOC. SCI. & MED. 577, 581 (1989).
33. Even physicians who report that they always or often use evidencebased medicine (EBM) in making practice decisions rely instead most heavily
on clinical experience. Ninety-three percent of physicians in one study
reported relying on clinical experience as an information source, and the rate
of reliance did not differ substantially between the group reporting
commitment to evidence-based medicine and the group that only sometimes or
rarely/never utilized EBM in their practice. Finlay A. McAlister et al.,
Evidence-Based Medicine and the Practicing Clinician, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 236, 238–39 (1999). Reliance on clinical experience may be dangerous,
of course. A study of data on the impact of clinical experience, in terms of
years of practice concluded that, in fact, experience may have an inverse
relationship
with
health
outcomes,
compliance
with
screening
recommendations, and information base for prescribing. Niteesh K. Choudhry
et al., Systematic Review: The Relationship Between Clinical Experience and
Quality of Health Care, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 260 (2005).
34. Ann Lennarson Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of the
Science: The Diffusion of New Medical Technologies into Practice, 4 INT’L J.
TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 5, 9 (1988); see also H.B. Slotnick, How
Doctors Learn: Physicians’ Self-directed Learning Episodes, 74 ACAD. MED.,
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There is also evidence that even when physicians do review
professional journals for relevant information for clinical
decision making, they are likely to fail to distinguish between
rigorous studies and preliminary studies; 35 may be limited in
their ability to assess the strength of any particular study; 36
and may in fact rely excessively on abstracts, overlooking
instances in which the abstract may overstate results. 37 In
addition, critics of peer-reviewed journals as a source of
guidance for clinical decision making have noted that journals
are not focused on the practitioner and often mix reports of a
few rigorous trials with many preliminary studies, making it
difficult for the practitioner (who may skip the methodology
section) to be discriminating in evaluating the quality of
information. 38 Physicians also may be as influenced by letters
and case reports published in journals, which can be merely
anecdotal, as by sound scientific studies. 39 The reliance on
anecdotal, informal reports is consistent with observations of a
higher trust level for clinical experience over clinical trials.
Written clinical guidelines standing alone also have proven
relatively ineffective in changing practice patterns. 40 While the
lack of influence of clinical guidelines may be attributed simply
1106, 1110 (1999) (stating that when addressing specific, acute needs, doctors
tend to rely on readily available literature and discussions with colleagues—
they are more likely to refer to medical journals for guidance in addressing
general problems).
35. R.B. Haynes, Loose Connections Between Peer-Reviewed Clinical
Journals and Clinical Practice, 113 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 724, 725 (1990).
36. Only 34% of physician respondents in one survey reported that they
had confidence in their ability to evaluate the methodology of a study on their
own, and only 46% felt capable of doing a literature search. McAlister et al.,
supra note 33.
37. One study of how residents learn, for example, observed that even the
“librarian residents,” a term used to describe those residents who reported
reading as a source of information, were most likely to read only the abstracts
and conclusions of articles. Stefan Timmermans & Alison Angell, EvidenceBased Medicine, Clinical Uncertainty, and Learning to Doctor, 42 J. HEALTH &
SOC. BEHAV. 342, 345–47 (2001).
38. Haynes, supra note 35.
39. Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard
Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373,
397 n.40 (2002). In one survey doctors reported that they referred to “review
articles” in journals (73%) but that they did not refer to “research studies”
(45%). McAlister, supra note 33 at 236.
40. See, e.g., James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines and Policies: Can They
Improve Emergency Department Pain Management?, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
783 (2005).
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to physician resistance to “cookbook medicine,” the more
intractable problem is the quality of most clinical guidelines.
For example, guidelines frequently produce only the most
general guidance, in part because of the dearth of clinical
research required to ground more specific, and perhaps more
influential, guidelines. 41 Thus, guidelines often must rely
extensively on “expert opinion” or consensus (a.k.a. committee)
efforts rather than data. Further, to the extent that specific
guidelines rely on the aggregation of published research
studies, they may simply incorporate biases in that literature. 42
Perhaps because of their trust of experience over controlled
studies, doctors may tend to rely on opinions of respected peers
and opinion leaders within the profession rather than on
clinical studies or clinical guidelines standing alone. Deference
to “group think” and to a hierarchy of opinion may be a learned
pattern of decision making adopted in the doctor’s experience of
residency training where the opinion of the attending physician
is revered as authoritative. 43 Studies document significant
influence of peer opinions on clinical decision making, 44
although some studies conclude that the context for the
transmission of opinions may make a difference in effect on
practice. 45
Documentation of medical practice patterns corroborates

41. See Sean R. Tunis et al., Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the
Value of Clinical Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy,
290 JAMA 1624, 1625 (2003). See generally Noah supra note 39 (discussing
practice guidelines).
42. Kleinke, supra note 28, at 36 (detailing the impact of bias in the
development of guidelines for the use of pharmaceuticals).
43. Timmermans, supra note 37, at 345–47.
44. See, e.g., Jane M. Young et al., Role for Opinion Leaders in Promoting
Evidence-Based Surgery, 138 ARCHIVES SURGERY 785, 785, 789 (2003)
(reporting that 88% of surgeons surveyed agreed that they had colleagues who
would be influential in altering their own practice, and 93.8% reported that
clinical opinion leaders in surgery were very or somewhat likely to influence
their practice patterns). Surgeons reported that opinion leaders were more
influential than clinical audits or clinical practice guidelines. Id. At the same
time, however, surgeons in this survey reported that peer-reviewed surgical
literature influenced their practice as well. Id.
45. At least one study indicates that the influence of opinion leaders
varies along the same lines as the influence of continuing medical education
described below. A. Wadhwa et al., A Qualitative Study of Interphysician
Telephone Consultations: Extending the Opinion Leader Theory, 25 J. CONTIN.
EDUC. HEALTH PROF. 98, 102 (2005).
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the reported reliance on peers and opinion leaders as these
studies reveal interregional practice heterogeneity as well as
One might expect that if
intraregional homogeneity. 46
physicians relied on scientific research results for medical
decision making, neither the variations among geographic
areas nor the homogeneity within regions would be so
pronounced.
Journals are not the only tool for formal learning in
medical practice. Continuing medical education (CME) is so
highly valued as a vehicle for updating clinical knowledge that
it is a routine licensure requirement for practicing physicians
and is often used as a rehabilitative mechanism in physician
discipline. 47 CME, however, is largely ineffective in achieving
its ultimate goal of improving practice.
A significant study analyzing empirical studies of the
impact of CME on practice decision making concluded that
studies consistently demonstrated that formal, didactic CME
exerts only a weak effect on practice patterns. 48 Lecture and
case-based CMEs, which are the custom of the trade, can
change information levels but do not change practice. The
authors of one article found that traditional didactic CME “has
little or no role to play” in changing practice. 49 A later analysis
confirmed this conclusion and noted that such programs “have
little or no beneficial effect in changing physician practice.” 50
46. The classic studies on interregional variations and intraregional
homogeneities in practice were done by John E. Wennberg. See, e.g., John E.
Wenberg Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3
HEALTH AFF. 6 (1984); see also K. McPherson et al., Small-Area Variations in
the Use of Common Surgical Procedures: An International Comparison of New
England, England, and Norway, 21 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1307, 1310–14 (1982).
The studies on interregional heterogeneity and local homogeneity of surgical
practice may contradict survey data of surgeons’ self-reported higher reliance
on peer-reviewed literature than on local colleagues. Young, supra note 44.
47. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 2190; MO. REV. STAT. § 330.160; see also
David A. Davis et al., Accuracy of Physician Self-Assessment Compared with
Observed Measures of Competence: A Systematic Review, 296 JAMA 1094,
1094–95 (2006) (describing CME requirements of state medical licensure
bodies, the Joint Commission, the specialty boards, and others).
48. David Davis et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education,
282 JAMA 867, 873 (1999).
49. Id. at 873.
50. B.S. Bloom, Effects of Continuing Medical Education on Improving
Clinical Care and Patient Health: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 21 INT’L J.
TECH. ASSESS. HEALTH CARE 380, 380 (2005); see also W. Sohn et al., Efficacy
of Educational Interventions Targeting Primary Care Providers’ Practice
Behaviors: An Overview of Published Systematic Reviews, 64 J. PUB. HEALTH
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Doctors absorb new information, but do not necessarily
incorporate it into their decision making.
Some CME pedagogies can effect change in practice. 51 In
particular, multiple contacts between instructor and student
following a learn-work-learn sequence; information provided at
the point of an expressed need to know; comparative
information on the practice of other physicians; enabling
materials that assist in interactions with patients (such as
patient education sheets, reminders, and such); mailed
materials followed up with personal phone calls; and proctoring
and shadowing all show more significant effects than the
standard CME. 52 Most CME, however, is the standard lectureformat didactic CME, 53 while most pharmaceutical detailing
(one-on-one representative-physician marketing) utilizes the
very same pedagogical methods that have been documented as
effective in changing practice in the CME context. 54
A Kaiser Family Foundation survey of doctors found that
74% thought information provided by drug representatives was
useful and 81% believed that the information was at least
DENTISTRY 164, 170–71 (2004).
51. A 2004 article, for example, reported that an “interactive, case-based,
educational intervention . . . using a series of interactive case-based
teleconferences” effected a change in prescribing for asthma even though
clinical guidelines recommending such prescribing had been ineffective in
changing practice in over ten years. R.S. Davis et al., Changing Physician
Prescribing Patterns Through Problem-Based Learning, 93 ANNALS ALLERGY
ASTHMA IMMUNOLOGY 237, 237 (2004); see also Paul E. Mazmanian & David
A. Davis, Continuing Medical Education and the Physician as a Learner, 288
JAMA 1057, 1059–60 (2002).
52. Davis, supra note 48, at 870–71; see also F. Daniel Duffy & Eric S.
Holmboe, Self-assessment in Lifelong Learning and Improving Performance in
Practice, 296 JAMA 1137, 1138 (2006) (discussing the importance of selfidentified learning needs as motivational tools for more effective CME).
53. Bloom, supra note 50, at 381.
54. Robert Cohen, “Unsales Pitches” Counter Drug Reps: Program Gives
Doctors Alternative Advice, Tips, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.) Sept. 9, 2007,
at 1 (quoting founder of program that brings academic physicians to doctors’
offices to discuss prescribing: “[d]rug companies are awfully talented and
effective in changing doctors’ prescribing behavior . . . . People in academia . . .
tend to be lousy communicators, and we are not very effective in changing
doctors’ prescribing practices.”); Wayne Kondro, Academic Drug Detailing: An
Evidence-Based Alternative, 176 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 429, 430 (2007)
(describing shift in independent drug education program from written reports
to office visits); Scott A. Kale et al., Teaching Doctors to Fish, MED.
MARKETING & MEDIA, Nov. 1, 2007, at 46 (describing methods of making
experts available to doctors and providing materials for patients).
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somewhat accurate. 55 Of course, this may be due to the “free
lunch” that comes with the information, 56 but it may also be
due to the more effective pedagogical methods—methods that
are responsive to clinical practice—used in this form of CME.
Once established, or once learned, practice and prescribing
patterns are hard to alter. Some studies of off-label prescribing
reveal habitual patterns among a significant segment of
physicians. 57 Habit may persist even when serious safety
concerns emerge. For example, while changes in drug labeling
regarding warnings of previously unknown, serious risks are
often mailed or faxed directly to physicians, studies indicate
that these mailings do not result in changes in prescribing
practice—that physicians frequently prescribed drugs in
violation of warnings, including black box warnings. 58 Of
55. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY OF PHYSICIANS PART II:
DOCTORS AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2002).
56. See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Health Industry Practices That Create a
Conflict of Interest, 295 JAMA 429 (2006); Dana Katz, All Gifts Large and
Small, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39 (2003); Wazana, supra note 30, at 378 (reporting
on studies that document increased prescribing associated with
pharmaceutical gifts; a positive disposition toward drug representatives; an
increase in physician requests to add a specific drug to the hospital’s or
insurer’s formulary in association with gifting; and doctors’ inability to
distinguish grounded from ungrounded claims). These studies do not measure
patient outcomes subsequent to prescribing changes, however.
Id.
Furthermore, some studies recognize specific positive effects, including
“improved ability to identify the treatment for complicated illnesses.” Id.
57. See, e.g., Judith K. Hellerstein, The Demand for Post-Patent
Prescription Pharmaceuticals (December 1994) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.Res.,
Working Paper No. W4981), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=226580.
58. Jerry H. Gurwitz, Serious Adverse Drug Effects—Seeing the Trees
Through the Forest, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1413, 1414 (2006). Black box
warnings are the most severe warnings the FDA can issue for a drug that is to
remain on the market despite newly discovered adverse effects. See K.E.
Lasser, Adherence to Black Box Warnings for Prescription Medications in
Outpatients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 338, 338 (2006) (reporting that
doctors in the study prescribed medications subject to black box warnings to
seven of one thousand outpatients, with female patients and patients over
seventy-five-years-old more likely to receive the medications; that fewer than
1% of patients who received such drugs had an adverse drug event; and that
“few incidents resulted in detectable harm”); A.K. Wagner, FDA Drug
Prescribing Warnings: Is the Black Box Half Empty or Half Full?, 15
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 369, 375 (2006) (reporting that
more than 40% of patients studied received a medication subject to a black box
warning applicable to their situation, including some specifically applicable to
pregnancy and that most of the non-compliance observed involved the absence
of baseline laboratory monitoring that should have accompanied the drug
therapy).
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course, part of the paradox in drug approval and postmarketing surveillance is evident in the case of black box
warnings in which the particular medication is not removed
from the market, but physicians are to be “cautious” in
prescribing because of risks discovered post-approval. There
may be good reasons for a doctor to continue prescribing a drug
with a black box warning, for example, because it is more
effective for the particular patient and that gain in
effectiveness outweighs the newly discovered risks. Thus,
continued prescribing of medication with a black box warning
in a particular case may be evidence of inappropriate habitual
prescribing, or it may be an exercise of appropriate medical
judgment. 59
The learning and information preferences observed in
physicians are common coping tools for managing massive
amounts of information. 60 The inclination to emulate their
peers in their practice decisions, to look to physician opinion
leaders, and to trust experience rather than to rely on
published scientific studies or formal FDA approval all assist
physicians in managing the information environment of
modern medical practice. The amount of medical information
available to a physician is overwhelming: for example, Medline
adds 30,000 citations to its database each month. 61 Although
Medline and other medical research databases are searchable,
doctors report a low confidence level in their ability to do a
59. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON SCI. AFF., REPORT 10 (A-05):
SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF SELECTIVE SEROTONIN REUPTAKE INHIBITORS
(SSRIS) IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (2005), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/category/15186.html.
[The American Medical Association . . .] recognizes that the current
product labeling (package insert) of antidepressant drugs, including
the Black Box warnings, is a precautionary statement intended to
reinforce the need for careful monitoring of patients with depression
and other psychiatric disorders during the initiation of treatment.
This product labeling should not be interpreted in a way that would
decrease access for patients who may benefit from these drugs.
This became American Medical Association (AMA) policy H-115.971 Safety
and Efficacy of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) in Children
and Adolescents. After reviewing the evidence, the AMA concluded that the
association between the antidepressants and rates of suicide was not
supported by data. Mark Moran, AMA Opposes Restrictions on SSRI Use in
Youngsters, 40 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1, 1 (2005), available at http://pn.
psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/40/14/1-b.
60. Noah, supra note 39, at 402–03.
61. Id.
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literature search on a particular question. 62
Similarly, informal communication networks among peers
allow physicians to transmit information much more quickly
than peer-reviewed journals can. Especially in certain practice
areas, oncology for example, the demand for access to a drug
may outpace the demand for scientific verification (for example,
through completion of ongoing but incomplete clinical trials) of
Furthermore,
the information that is being shared. 63
information gathered from peers comes with an interpretative
framework of experience that is valued in medicine. 64
These learning preferences show us a construct of patients
as highly variable and medical practice as highly intuitive and
reliant on judgment or discretion. The averages produced in
scientific studies will not necessarily account for the individual
patient presenting to the individual physician, and this
problem of heterogeneity extends to individualized responses to
medications. 65
Finally, in a tradition-oriented profession like medicine,
there is safety in the herd. Malpractice and professional
disciplinary standards, to the extent that they compare an
individual doctor’s decisions to a national or community
custom, reinforce reliance on peer example by rewarding those
who assure that their practice is within the mainstream. In
some instances, regulatory agencies have used departure from
majority prescribing practices as indicia of criminal or licensure
violations. 66
Unwillingness to rely on scientific studies as essential for
prescribing may reflect patterns of learning and practice that
are simply resistant to scientific evidence regardless of the
quality of information available. Reliance on peers and peer
practices may also be a response to ineffective dissemination of
knowledge through other outlets, including both journal
articles and continuing medical education programs.
In
62. McAlister et al., supra note 33.
63. Klein & Tabarrok, supra note 27, at 60.
64. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.
65. Heterogeneity is a particular problem in the responsiveness of
patients to particular medications, both in terms of effectiveness and adverse
effects. Soumerai, supra note 28, at 143; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at
118–20.
66. See, e.g., Symposium, Appropriate Management of Pain: Addressing
the Clinical, Legal, and Regulatory Barriers, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 285
(1996).
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addition to these considerations, deficiencies in the production
and quality of clinical knowledge, discussed in the next section,
may actually reinforce clinicians’ skepticism of the utility of
research studies in their prescribing decisions.
PART II: THE LIMITED UTILITY OF CLINICAL RESEARCH
FOR OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING DECISIONS
If off-label uses of an approved medication are to be tested
at all, those tests, by definition, will be conducted after the
drug is approved for the market. As discussed earlier, the FDA
does not ordinarily require significant post-marketing clinical
research as a condition of approval of a particular drug, even
though it has some authority to do so.
Furthermore,
prescribing doctors do not exert strong market demand for postmarketing research for off-label prescribing. Weak demand for
post-marketing research, both through regulatory channels and
in the prescribing market, 67 has produced an insufficient
supply of clinical knowledge for off-label prescribing. This gap
certainly exists in the case of non-approved uses. It also,
however, exists in the (potentially more common) incidents of
off-label prescribing of approved medications for untested
patient populations in which there may be significant
disparities in effectiveness and safety of the drug (e.g., certain
drugs tested only on men but prescribed for women and drugs
tested only on adults but prescribed for children). Additionally,
the gap exists when drugs are prescribed for doses or durations
(e.g., long-term instead of short-term) that have not been tested
in clinical trials prior to approval.
Off-label prescribing is not unique in raising the issue of
insufficient clinical research. The negative impact of the
insufficiency in the production of Phase IV clinical trials
extends to all prescribing, including off-label prescribing and
prescribing within the scope of approval. Phase IV studies
typically will be the first in which very large numbers of
persons are studied. For comparison, Phase III trials, the
largest of the pre-approval trials, ordinarily involve only 1,000
to 3,000 people, 68 a number that is too small to reveal

67. See supra Part I.
68. See supra note 9.
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uncommon, though quite serious, adverse effects. 69
In
addition, the pre-approval trials are time-limited, while postmarketing trials can extend for a much longer time, again
increasing the likelihood that adverse events that arise only
with very long-term use will be detected. In addition, preapproval trials generally rely on a “naïve” subject population,
one that will not present the risk of drug interactions because
these interactions may confound the results for the tested
drug. 70 Once available for prescribing, however, the approved
drug will be used by patients taking any number of other
medications. Phase IV trials often present the first opportunity
for testing the risks of drug interactions. Equally importantly,
approved medications are prescribed for individuals, including
both the elderly and children as well as individuals with
medical conditions such as diabetes, in whom the medication
may behave quite differently in terms of both effect and
safety. 71 These differences are likely to be detected only in the
post-marketing phase of research. 72 Finally, the FDA does not
require proof of comparative efficacy for approval of a new
medication, so trials that compare one drug to another usually
take place, if at all, only after a new medication has been
approved. 73
Weak demand for post-marketing clinical trials results in
inadequate numbers of these trials to meet the needs of
practicing physicians. The problem for clinical decision making
69. Richard Gliklich, Keeping Approvals on Track, 14 APPLIED CLINICAL
TRIALS 28, 28, 30 (2005).
70. Id. at 28–29.
71. Scott Gottlieb, Opening Pandora’s Pillbox: Using Modern Information
Tools to Improve Drug Safety, 24 HEALTH AFF. 938, 939 (2005) (“There is little
chance that [preapproval] trials will ever provide a complete review of how a
new treatment will perform when it is used in much broader populations of
patients in real-world clinical settings.”).
72. DeMonaco et al., supra note 6.
73. See David B. Ross, The FDA and the Case of Ketek, 356 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1601, 1601 (2007) (discussing change in FDA policy reducing
requirements for noninferiority trials as part of approval processes). Those
comparative studies currently conducted can suffer from design flaws relating
to whether the appropriate dosage is chosen for the comparable drug and
other issues.
K.J. Jørgensen et al., Flaws in Design, Analysis and
Interpretation of Pfizer’s Antifungal Trials of Voriconazole and Uncritical
Subsequent Quotations, 7 TRIALS 3 (2006); see Valeria Frighi, Medical
Journals, Academia, and Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials, 2 PLOS MED.7,
e218 0686, 0686 (2005); J. Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry
Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT.
MED. J. 1167, 1170 (2003), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/.
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regarding off-label prescribing is not one entirely of sheer
volume but includes quality concerns as well. The quality of
current post-approval clinical trials falls short of meeting the
needs of prescribers. The first quality concern emerges from
the presumed impact of the source of funding for the bulk of
clinical trials. The second quality concern arises from the gap
between the design of clinical trials and the circumstances of
ordinary medical practice.
A. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FUNDING
Randomized controlled clinical trials are expensive. The
large number of subjects involved and long lifespan of Phase IV
trials make them particularly expensive. The pharmaceutical
industry is not the only source of financing for post-marketing
clinical research; but it is the biggest by far. 74 The federal
National Institutes of Health (NIH) has been expanding its
commitment to clinical research of late, but in recent years has
only spent 30% of its budget (approximately $850 million) on
pharmaceutical clinical trials of all types, including Phase I, II,
III and Phase IV trials. 75 The federal Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) spends approximately $30
million annually on clinical trials, although again not only
Phase IV trials. 76 The Veterans’ Administration has conducted
some significant trials of medical interventions, but its budget
for such research is only approximately $55 million per year,
and again not devoted entirely to pharmaceutical research. 77
The Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics, a
joint FDA-AHRQ effort aimed at improving the production of
clinical knowledge, has an annual budget of $7 million to
support clinical trials of drugs. 78 The Medicare program has
also begun to “fund” clinical research studies on its own
beneficiaries through a condition on payment for experimental
74. The proportion of public to private dollars for clinical research is likely
to move in the direction of decreasing public support. Researchers Should Rely
Less on NIH Grants, More on Industry Funding, Bush Adviser Says, 6 MED.
RES. L. & POL’Y REP., May 16, 2007, at d4.
75. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1628.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. AHRQ, FACT SHEET CENTER FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH ON
THERAPEUTICS (CERTS) (2004), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/
certsovr.pdf.
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interventions. 79 In comparison to the approximately $950
million of federal money devoted to all phases of clinical trials,
pharmaceutical firms may be spending as much as $8 to $12
billion on post-marketing trials alone. 80 Although private
insurers and pharmacy benefits management programs are
beginning to produce clinical research on approved drugs, this
nascent effort is confined largely to collecting data from the
pharmaceutical industry. 81 Even if this effort increases, the
information produced may be viewed as proprietary.
Critics
have
raised
substantial
concerns
over
79. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL COVERAGE
DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COVERAGE:
COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT § VI (2006), available at
https://www.cms.hhs.gov/pf/printpage.asp?ref=http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/nc
pc_view_document.asp?id=8; see also Sandra J. Carnahan, Medicare’s
Coverage with Study Participation Policy: Clinical Trials or Tribulations, 7
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 229, 231 (2007); see also discussion of data
collection by private insurers, supra note 12.
80. See, e.g., CUTTING EDGE INFO., MASTERING PHASE IV CLINICAL TRIALS
(2007) (estimating expenditures of $12 billion), available at http://www.
cuttingedgeinfo.com/postmarketingtrials/index.htm?type=GoogleAdWordsCont
ent&gclid=CNPzsKf2to8CFQUsPAodGyBDeA. The same study said firms
spent an average of 14% of their total research and development budgets on
post-marketing trials. Phase 4 Clinical Trials Claim an Average of 14% of
R&D Budgets, Study Says, MARKETWIRE, Nov. 14, 2007, http://www.
marketwire.com/mw/release.do?id=792873; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7–8 (2006),
available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf (reporting
annual industry spending on all R & D of $38 million, and National Science
Foundation estimate that 20% of that is spent on post-marketing research
which the NSF excludes from its calculation of pharmaceutical R & D). Some
of the expenditure reported by industry in support of post-marketing trials is
more appropriately allocated to marketing efforts that may be enfolded in
these trials. See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 145. As with all of the figures for
research and development investment by pharmaceutical firms, estimated
expenditures come from the industry itself and estimates vary. See, e.g., GAO,
NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT
EFFORTS, 4, 39 (2006) (reporting that industry spent $40 billion on all
research and development in 2004 but stating that the GAO “did not
independently verify these expenditure data; . . . and they represent the best
available information at the time of our study”).
81. See, e.g., Peter J. Neumann, Evidence-Based and Value-Based
Formulary Guidelines, 23 HEALTH AFF. 124 (2004). Interestingly, the
Neurontin settlement, discussed in Part III, is providing grants to
organizations to study prescribing patterns and provide education to doctors
and consumers concerning sources of information for prescription drugs.
Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, AG Myers & Kitzhaber Address A “1st of
Its Kind” Conference in Portland (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.doj.
state.or.us/releases/2006/rel120406.shtml.
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pharmaceutical industry support for research even though it is
essential to the production of clinical knowledge due to
seriously inadequate public funding. The vigorous debate over
industry support of clinical trials challenges the credibility of
clinical research on which clinical, management, and
regulatory decisions, at least theoretically, should rely.
Furthermore, the resulting credibility crisis may have a
nonspecific but pervasive effect on the uptake of clinical
research results into medical practice, especially if physician
learning and decision making is already skeptical of the utility
of scientific studies. 82 Finally, the quality of clinical research
limits its utility for public and private controls over physician
prescribing. If clinical studies are biased, then public and
private efforts to control prescribing rely on defective
information. 83
B. WHOSE BIAS?
In January of 2003, Bekelman et al. published a watershed
article on the impact of funding source on research results. 84
In this article, they performed a meta-analysis of 37 published
quantitative studies that compared the source of funding with
the outcomes of 1140 biomedical studies, many of which were
The Bekelman study thus examined the
drug studies. 85
aggregation of data over several studies of single drugs or other
The authors concluded that the
medical interventions. 86
sponsorship of a study was very closely associated with the
outcome reported, even in the case of random controlled trials:
“Strong and consistent evidence shows that industry-sponsored
research tends to draw pro-industry conclusions. . . . [W]e found
that industry-sponsored studies were significantly more likely
82. See supra notes 26 & 28.
83. See infra text accompanying note 87.
84. Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of
Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454 (2003);
see also Mohit Bhandari et al., Association Between Industry Funding and
Statistically Significant Pro-Industry Findings in Medical and Surgical
Randomized Trials, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 477, 477 (2004); James F. Fries &
Eswar Krishnan, Equipoise, Design Bias, and Randomized Controlled Trials:
The Elusive Ethics of New Drug Development, 6 ARTHRITIS RES. & THERAPY 3,
R250 (2004), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/; Lexchin et al.,
supra note 73, at 1167.
85. See Bekelman et al., supra note 84, at 456.
86. Id.
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to reach conclusions that were favorable to the sponsor than
were nonindustry studies.” 87
The pattern of “pro-industry conclusions,” as the authors
termed the phenomenon, was pronounced in several
instances. 88 For example, studies of the results of articles on
calcium channel blockers reported that 51% of authors with
industry funding reported positive results in trials of the drugs,
while 0% of authors of studies that were not sponsored by
interested firms reported positive results. 89 Other studies
showed less dramatic differences, but a difference of
approximately 20% was common when comparing the rate of
positive and negative outcomes over the aggregated studies of
particular drugs or other interventions. 90
It is indicative of this time of turmoil in clinical research
that it’s not clear where the blame lies for the observed bias in
studies reviewed, accepted and published in medical journals.
Does the association of sponsorship with positive results reflect
bias on the part of the industry-funded researcher? 91 Or is the
bias the result of the pharmaceutical firms’ selectivity in
choosing to fund only studies with a high likelihood of positive
outcome, thereby strengthening the market for their product? 92
Or is the bias produced by research contracts or grants in
which the sponsor retains the unilateral right to release results
for publication or not, allowing the sponsor to control the flow
of information through the journals to the medical market? 93
87. Id. at 463.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 456.
90. Id. at 458.
91. The Bekelman article considers several factors contributing to
disproportionately positive results, but does not list individual researcher bias
among those. Bekelman et al., supra note 84, at 463. But see Catherine D.
DeAngelis, Editorial, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 296 JAMA
996, 996 (2006).
92. See, e.g., Fries & Krishnan, supra note 84. The authors hypothesize
that “extensive preliminary data are used to design [industry-funded] studies
with a high likelihood of being positive.” Id. at R250. They further report that
company consultants and staff review “what is known about the drug, its
competitors, its potential advantages in terms of toxicity or efficacy, and the
potential disease indications” and then design trials that include the “patients,
dosages, study duration, end-points, and comparators that are likely to
provide a positive result for the sponsor and one that is acceptable to the
F.D.A.” Id. at R252.
93. In a 1986 survey of research faculty, 24% of those funded by industry
reported restrictions on publication of study results compared to 5% of those
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Or do the journals themselves contribute to selection bias by
rejecting studies that “show that a new treatment is inferior to
standard treatment” or “that are neither clearly positive nor
clearly negative”? 94
Any one of these reasons casts doubt on the reliability not
only of a single published article, but even more significantly on
the entire body of published research about a particular drug.
Systemic bias has serious implications for the aggregation of
published results. Such aggregation of results supplies the
“evidence” for evidence-based medicine for practice guidelines
and consensus statements for treatment decisions. 95 If
published results in the aggregate show a bias toward “proindustry” conclusions, the disutility of published clinical trials
becomes apparent and raises a critical issue for the practicing
physician. Moreover, any gatekeeper, governmental or private,
with other funding for research. D. Blumenthal et al., University-Industry
Research Relationships in Biotechnology: Implications for the University, 232
SCIENCE 1361, 1364 (1986); cf. Richard Smith, Essay, Medical Journals Are an
Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 PLOS MED.
0364, 0365 (2005), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/ (reporting
that suppression of results is “too crude” a method for influencing the body of
published work and reviewing other methods that can achieve the same
effect). In fact, Bekelman et al. report that suppression of data is less likely in
industry-sponsored studies than in studies in which the researcher is “in the
process of bringing their research results to market.” Bekelman et al., supra
note 84, at 463. See generally infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text
(discussing the Bayh-Dole Act).
94. Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International
Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250
(2004); see also J.D. Kleinke, supra note 28, at 35–36 (discussing the tendency
of journals toward publishing articles that expand the use of more aggressive
and more expensive drug therapies); Smith, supra note 93, at 0365 (describing
a strategy of publishing the results of multi-center trials in a number of
publications as separate results to produce a body of research that shows a
high frequency of positive results, a strategy that directly benefits publishers
of medical journals as well as the manufacturer).
95. Experts review the aggregation of study results when developing
clinical practice guidelines and consensus statements. A study of such
experts, however, found that 87% had financial connections to pharmaceutical
firms. Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Relationships Between Authors of Clinical
Practice Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 287 JAMA 612, 614
(2002). These relationships may have no effect on the content of the
guidelines. See Bekelman et al., supra note 84, at 463. See generally David G.
Duvall, Conflict of Interest or Ideological Divide, 22 CURRENT MED. RES. &
OPINION 1807 (2006). The use of expert opinion in the development of
guidelines also illustrates the reliance on peer and leader opinions in medical
decision making. See supra text accompanying notes 28–34.
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that aims at controlling individual prescribing decisions by
reference to published clinical studies must also contend with
this suspect reliability.
The Bekelman piece is only one example of the mounting
concern over bias in published clinical studies. In the four
years since this watershed analysis, the trickle of concern over
the validity and purity of research results published in the
gold-standard peer-reviewed journals has grown into a
In a summer 2006 editorial, Dr. Catherine
torrent. 96
DeAngelis, the editor-in-chief of JAMA, identified a litany of
examples of “research irregularities” in research sponsored by
“for-profit companies.” 97 These examples include “refusal to
provide all study data to the study team, reporting only 6
months of data in a trial designed to have 12 months of
data . . . ; incomplete reporting of serious adverse events; and
concealing clinical trial data showing harm.” 98 She further
detailed her concerns that industry sponsorship of clinical
studies can “exert inappropriate influence in research via
control of study data and statistical analysis, ghostwriting,
managing all or most aspects of manuscript preparation, and
dictating to investigators the journals to which they should
submit their manuscripts,” noting that some companies are
rumored to be preventing researchers from publishing in JAMA
because of its conflicts-of-interest requirements. 99 Many share
96. Although the following discussion focuses on the issues arising in the
publication of clinical studies, research centers also have established policies
to manage conflicts of interest in the conduct of research. For example, the
American Association of Medical Colleges has recommended that medical
research universities establish conflict-of-interest policies. Press Release,
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., AAMC Urges Speedy Adoption of NIH Conflict of
Interest Reforms (May 6, 2004), available at http://www.aamc.org/ newsroom/
pressrel/2004/040506.htm; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: MOST FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED TO PROTECT AGAINST
FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 3 (2003), available at http://www.eric.ed.
gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/1b/9c/c1.pdf
(reporting that all of the 171 universities surveyed had conflicts-of-interest
policies for their researchers and that 87% of research universities had policies
that complied with NIH and NSF guidelines); infra, text accompanying notes
162–163 (discussing governmental policies on conflicts of interest). See
generally Peter J. Harrington, Faculty Conflicts of Interest in an Age of
Academic Entrepreneurialism: An Analysis of the Problem, the Law and
Selected University Policies, 27 J.C. & U.L. 775 (2001) (discussing a variety of
conflicts of interest, focusing on those with industry).
97. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 996.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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DeAngelis’ concerns, 100 and the behaviors she identifies are
well documented. 101 In addition to JAMA’s adventures, the
New England Journal of Medicine dealt with its own
controversy with industry-supported research when, after
publishing the results of clinical trials of Vioxx, it published
notices stating that Merck may have intentionally altered the
evidence. 102
Conflicts-of-interest analysis, which has framed the debate
over industry funding of clinical trials, can go only so far in
responding to the crisis in the reliability, real or perceived, of
As most critics acknowledge,
clinical research. 103
pharmaceutical industry support for clinical research has
significant benefits, and it is highly unrealistic to think that

100. The most prominent critique of the pharmaceutical industry,
including their research efforts, is by another editor, Marcia Angell, former
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. See generally MARCIA
ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004).
101. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical
Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539,
1542 (2000) (documenting ghostwriting); see also United States ex rel.
McDermott v. Genentech, No. 05-147-P-C, 2006 WL 3741920, at *3 (D. Me.
Dec. 14, 2006) (discussing alleged ghostwriting by pharmaceutical firms).
102. Gregory D. Curfman et al., Expression of Concern Reaffirmed, 354
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193, 1193 (2006); see also Claire Bombardier et al.,
Correspondence, Response to Expression of Concern Regarding VIGOR Study,
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1196, 1196–98 (2006) (addressing the concerns of
Curfman et al.); Lancet Editors, Editorial, Vioxx: An Unequal Partnership
Between Safety and Efficacy, 364 LANCET 1287, 1288 (2004) (noting that “the
real picture of cardiovascular risk has been apparent for some time and
Merck’s vigorous defense of this drug in the past was clearly an error” and
that “the Vioxx story is one of blindly aggressive marketing by Merck mixed
with repeated episodes of complacency by drug regulators”); Richard Horton,
Comment, Vioxx, The Implosion of Merck, and Aftershocks at the FDA, 364
LANCET 1995, 1995–96 (2004).
103. See William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why
Banning “Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical
Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413, 1413–18 (2007) (arguing that “conflicts of
interest” as a term is used too broadly and thwarts effective responses to
incentives in research). Conflicts of interests in research raise other issues, of
course, including concerns over the protection of human subjects either
because of misunderstandings or miscommunication of the purpose of the
intervention or because of enrollment pressures. See, e.g., Kevin W. Williams,
Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials
Conducted in the Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 68–69
(2004).
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patients would be better off without it. 104
Furthermore,
conflicts-of-interest regulation has limited usefulness as a tool
for controlling for the impact of funding on the quality of
clinical research.
JAMA’s own response to the credibility crisis illustrates
some of the limitations of the conflicts-of-interest response to
perceived deficiencies in clinical research. JAMA, like other
medical journals, 105 has instituted several policies to handle
financial conflicts of interest related to articles submitted for
Among those, the requirement of author
publication. 106
disclosure of financial interests and the requirement of
independent data analysis for industry-supported studies
suggest that current responses to financial conflicts of interest
in clinical research are imperfect at best. 107
C. DISCLOSURE AND SKEPTICISM
JAMA requires that authors disclose financial conflicts of
interest related to the research reported in their submitted
article. JAMA began requesting disclosure by authors in

104. Brennan et al., supra note 30, at 252–53; DeAngelis, supra note 91, at
996.
105. JAMA is a member of the International Committee of Medical Journal
Editors (ICMJE), which has established conflict-of-interest policies that each
member journal agrees to enforce. Members of ICMJE include the New
England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet, Annals of Internal Medicine, and
others. See ICMJE—Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to
Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication,
http://www.icmje.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
106. For example, journal members of the ICMJE, including JAMA, in
response to episodes of suppression of the results of studies, require that
clinical trials be posted in a “public trials registry” as a condition of
submission for publication. Id. One of the most highly publicized instances of
alleged suppression involved study results indicating that the use of Paxil by
adolescents suffering from depression may increase suicide rates for that
population. Eliot Spitzer, the former Attorney General of New York, sued
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) for its actions in regard to Paxil. As part of the
settlement, GSK agreed to establish a clinical trials registry on which it would
post summaries of all clinical studies within ten months of the completion of
the study. At the same time, several other pharmaceutical companies
established similar sites. GSK Will Disclose Clinical Trial Data, Settles Case
Brought by New York AG, 13 HEALTH L. REP. 1290, 1290 (2004). In a
settlement just a few days later, Forest Laboratories agreed to establish a
registry on which it would list its ongoing clinical trials as well as the results
of completed trials. Forest Laboratories to Create Registry Summarizing
Clinical Trials of its Products, 13 HEALTH L. REP. 1325, 1325 (2004).
107. See DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 997.

JOHNSON S. POLLUTING MEDICAL JUDGMENT? FALSE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PURSUIT OF FALSE
CLAIMS REGARDING OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2007;9(1):61-124.

92

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 9:1

1985; 108 made disclosure mandatory in 1989; 109 began
publishing author disclosures in 1990; 110 and strengthened its
disclosure requirements in 2006, 111 in response to concerns
about author non-compliance with the Journal’s prior
disclosure requirements. 112 The purpose of publishing financial
relationship disclosures, according to the Journal’s editor-inchief, is “so that readers can interpret the article in light of that
information.” 113 It is not clear exactly how the reader, even the
medically-trained reader, is to take the disclosed conflict into
account in evaluating whether the article should influence
prescribing decisions, however.
A quick look at recent issues of JAMA suggests the
complexity of accounting for a disclosed relationship when
evaluating an article as a source of information to incorporate
in practice. In a selection of recent JAMA issues, 114 at least
one of the authors for approximately one-third (thirty-five of
one-hundred-six) of articles categorized by the Journal as
“Original Contributions” (thirty-one of ninety) or “Reviews”
(four of sixteen) disclosed financial relationships. 115 Four of the
thirty-five instances of reported relevant financial relationships
were by authors of Reviews, meta-analyses of previously
published studies that are among the most influential articles
in medical journals. 116 Because “the essence of reviews and
108. Elizabeth Knoll & George D. Lundberg, Editorial, New Instructions for
JAMA Authors, 254 JAMA 97, 97 (1985).
109. George D. Lundberg & Annette Flanagin, Editorial, New
Requirements for Authors, 262 JAMA 2003, 2003 (1989).
110. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 997.
111. Annette Flanagin, Editorial, Update on JAMA’s Conflict of Interest
Policy, 296 JAMA 220, 220 (2006).
112. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 997 (“[T]here simply is no way to
guarantee that all financial relationships and arrangements of all authors are
disclosed.”).
113. Id. at 997.
114. The sample consisted of every fourth issue published between January
5, 2005 and August 2, 2006 for a total of twenty issues.
115. It is likely, however, that more authors than actually disclosed such
relationships had financial dealings with sponsors that would be covered by
the JAMA disclosure requirement.
116. In one study, 73% of physician respondents reported that they used
review articles as an information source. McAlister et al., supra note 33, at
236. These review articles may be attractive to physicians because they
evaluate a number of articles. In the same survey, only 34% of respondent
physicians believed that they were able to evaluate the methodology of a study
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editorials is selection and interpretation of the literature,” the
New England Journal of Medicine refuses to publish reviews by
authors who have a “significant” financial interest relevant to
the subject matter of the review, although it had to relax its
prohibition in 2002 because of its inability to secure reviews of
drug therapies under the former standards. 117
Five of the twelve Reviews in JAMA for which no author
made a financial disclosure involved review of an issue for
which there is no apparent pharmaceutical connection in
treatment or diagnosis, while seven Reviews addressed issues
with obvious implication for drug therapies or diagnosis. All
four of the Reviews written by authors who disclosed financial
relationships, however, reviewed pharmaceutical interventions.
Thus, of the seven Reviews with apparent pharmaceutical
subject matter, more than half were written by authors with
disclosable financial relationships.
These numbers may
actually under-report the proportion of JAMA articles written
by authors with relevant financial interests as there have been
some reports of authors failing to disclose required
information. 118
In an editorial published in JAMA describing the
implementation of its disclosure policy, the editor-in-chief
argued that all articles in JAMA have passed “rigorous peer
review and careful editorial evaluation.” 119 She went on to
observe that that the failure of authors of several articles
published by JAMA to disclose required information in early
2006 “does not automatically translate to the article being
flawed.” 120 Still, “[f]or disclosure to be effective, the recipient of
advice must understand how the conflict of interest has
influenced the advisor and must be able to correct for that
biasing influence.” 121

on their own and only 46% felt capable of doing a literature search. Id.
117. Jeffrey M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, Editorial, Financial
Associations of Authors, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1901, 1901 (2002) (observing
that the Journal had been able to secure only one review article on novel drug
therapy over the course of two years under its former prohibition of any
financial interest on the part of review authors).
118. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 997.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Daylian Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2005); see supra notes
32 and 34.
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So, how should the practicing physician or practice
guidelines development panel take the disclosed financial
support into account and “correct for that biasing influence”? If
JAMA publishes an article after applying its “rigorous” peer
review process with the reviewers aware of the relevant
financial interests, what more would the individual practicing
physician be able to bring to the critique of the research? If the
practicing physician is simply to be “skeptical,” the advice
confirms the pattern of skepticism about scientific journals
discussed earlier. 122 If that pattern of skepticism is to be
encouraged, then what should the physician rely on in deciding
to prescribe medications off-label? Experience? Intuition?
Peer opinion leaders? Enlarging the scope just a bit, how
should consensus or practice guideline panels treat the onethird of JAMA articles that are written by authors with
financial self-interest? These articles can hardly be eliminated
from consideration because they are likely to be the only source
of peer-reviewed data and may in fact be valid.
Disclosure does not itself remedy concerns with the quality
of clinical information. Disclosure of conflicts of interest has
not produced the desired response in the clinical context. The
process of disclosing financial conflicts of interest may
encourage the physician to grant him or herself a “moral
license” to behave differently after making disclosure. 123 In
addition, disclosure of conflicts of interest by the doctor in a
therapeutic relationship may actually increase the patient’s
trust level rather than putting them on guard. 124 The doctorreader may behave differently than patients in this regard,
however, because doctors tend to believe that other physicians
may be influenced by their financial interests even while they
believe they themselves are not. 125
D. BLESSED BY ACADEMIA
In an additional response to financial conflicts of interest
in research, JAMA has established a special rule for
independent statistical analysis for industry-sponsored studies.
122. See generally sources cited supra notes 32 and 34.
123. Cain et al., supra note 121, at 7.
124. Id. at 5–6.
125. Jason Dana, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians From
Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 254 (2003).
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In 2005, JAMA began requiring that the authors of industrysponsored studies in which data analysis was done “only by
statisticians employed by the company sponsoring the
research” submit an “independent analysis of the data . . .
conducted by statisticians at an academic institution, such as a
medical school, academic medical center, or government
research institute” as a condition of consideration for
publication. 126 The preference for biostatisticians working at
an “academic institution” assumes that where the evaluation is
conducted makes a difference. Furthermore, JAMA does not
require independent data analysis of studies conducted and
analyzed in academic institutions working under contract (such
as through a research grant) with a for-profit industry
By implication, industry sponsorship is less
sponsor. 127
dangerous when the academy is industry’s partner.
In fact, a great deal of clinical research has moved out of
the academic medical centers (AMCs) and into contract
research organizations (CROs) 128 and private physician offices.
Although estimates of the magnitude of the shift from AMCs to
private physician offices or CROs vary, all agree that there has
been a landslide in that direction and that it continues to grow.
At most, 40% of the funding of clinical trials is currently being
placed with academic medical centers; and 60% is being placed
with private practices, 129 a three-fold increase in ten years.
Fewer than half of researchers work in academic medical

126. Phil B. Fontanarosa et al., Reporting Conflicts of Interest, Financial
Aspects of Research, and Role of Sponsors in Funded Studies, 294 JAMA 110,
111 (2005).
127. See id.
128. Contract Research Organizations are typically independent, for-profit
companies that provide research services under contract with entities
including pharmaceutical companies, the government and other groups
engaged in clinical research. The CROs conduct basic research and clinical
trials and also provide other services, including data and safety monitoring
services, for researchers. CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND
REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 78 (2005). CRO services
may also include regulatory compliance support, quality control, and support
for marketing. Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research,
CROs also contract with site
19 HEALTH AFF. 129, 137–38 (2000).
management service providers to assist doctors in private practice in
recruiting patients for research protocols. K. Morin et al., Managing Conflicts
of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 79 (2002).
129. Morin et al., supra note 128, at 78; COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 128,
at 77.
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centers, representing an 80% decrease over ten years. 130 The
number of physicians in private practice engaged in protocols
tripled to nearly 12,000 between 1990 and 1995. 131 Estimates
of CRO participation in pharmaceutical research suggest an
annual growth rate of approximately 20% between 1995 and
2000. 132
Research has become a profit center for the physician in
private practice. 133 The sponsor typically pays the doctor a fee
of between $2000 and $5000 per patient enrolled, sometimes
requiring little beyond the collection of minimal data. 134 The
NIH generally pays somewhat lower enrollment fees for
research in AMCs. 135 According to a study published in 2000,
doctors in private practice who engage in industry-funded
studies also tend to receive additional compensation from
sponsors. 136
This trend of moving clinical trials from academic medical
centers to private practices will likely continue due to the
attendant advantages. Post-marketing clinical trials require
very large numbers of patients. Researchers may capture these
numbers more quickly by paying private physicians to recruit
their own patients rather than by paying an academic
researcher to recruit individuals from the general population or
from teaching hospitals. 137 Practicing physician researchers
130. Morin et al., supra note 128, at 78; see Jason E. Klein & Alan R.
Fleischmann, The Private Practicing Physician Investigator: Ethical
Implications of Clinical Research in the Office Setting, 32 HASTINGS CTR.
REPT. 22, 22 (2002).
131. Mark Hovde & Robert Seskin, Selecting U.S. Clinical Investigators,
APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALS 34, 36 (1997).
132. Rettig, supra note 128, at 134.
133. Payment for enrollment of patients in clinical trials can substantially
exceed the amounts paid by Medicare or third-party payers for treating those
patients. Morin et al., supra note 128, at 81; see also Deborah Borfitz, Can
“Phase IV” Trials Work for You?, 80 MED. ECON. 58, 58 (2003), available at
http://www.memag.com/memag/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=111425 (describing
benefits and obligations for research in private practice).
134. Morin et al., supra note 128, at 81.
135. NIH studies typically pay approximately $1,000 per enrollee. Id.
136. Physicians engaging in such studies may also be paid consulting fees
for giving a presentation, receive an educational stipend, or receive authorship
on a journal article reporting the results from the research. Office of Inspector
General, supra note 9, at 16.
137. See id. at 14–15; see also Financial Relationships and Interests in
Research Involving Human Subjects: Guidance for Human Subject Protection,
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and contract research organizations may be able to complete
clinical trials more quickly than an AMC because universities
In
often have additional administrative requirements. 138
addition, clinical research at physicians’ offices may provide
better models for medical decision making due to the varying
practice settings, patient backgrounds, and practitioner skill
levels available in that environment. 139 Finally, as discussed
in Part III of this article, funding post-approval studies in
private medical offices may serve other non-research marketing
interests for the pharmaceutical firms as well. 140
The JAMA policy requiring university or government
analyses of data implies that the AMC provides a greater
defense against industry behavior that undermines the
reliability of clinical studies. 141 The policy implies that the
interests of the academic clinician researcher and the academic
medical center will militate against acceptance of agreements
allowing the sponsor to control publication of results; will more
likely demand valid research design; and will be more likely to
produce accurate data and reliable statistical analyses and
interpretation. The assumption that academic researchers
would be particularly sensitive to, and avoid, financial conflicts
of interest is challenged by the fact that compliance with
JAMA’s relatively benign disclosure requirements has proven
spotty among academic researchers at very well-respected
research universities. 142 Beyond questions of character or
understanding 143 that might lie beneath these individual
69 Fed. Reg. 26,393, 26,394 (May 12, 2004).
138. Susanne Rust & Cary Spivak, Drug-testing Industry Turns to Private
Sector, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 2007, at A17; see Kevin Williams,
Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials
Conducted in the Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 62–63
(2004) (discussing the perceived advantages of conducting clinical trials in
private physician offices).
139. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1627; see supra note 65 and infra text
accompanying notes 213–215.
140. See supra note 65 and infra text accompanying notes 213–215.
141. See generally Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in
Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the
Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 379 (2000).
142. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 996; see also Goldner, supra note 141, at
384 (detailing the additional pressures in the academic environment that
produce conflicts of interest).
143. See, e.g., David Henry et al., Ties That Bind: Multiple Relationships
Between Clinical Researchers and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 165 ARCHIVES
INTERNAL MED. 2493, 2495 (2005) (noting studies demonstrating that
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instances of noncompliance, contemporary circumstances
challenge the assumed singularity of interests in the academic
research endeavor.
Elite research universities and their medical centers rely
primarily on NIH funding to support their research efforts.
Even in these institutions, however, industry-funded research
enhances the discretionary budget by providing a margin that
remains in the control of the department or the researcher
rather than the university budget office. 144 AMCs other than
the research elite may be losing the competition for the now
shrinking NIH research dollar and hence increasingly rely on
pharmaceutical research contracts to fill the gap. 145 The BayhDole Act of 1980 146 significantly altered the interests of
academic researchers and universities by introducing an
incentive for entrepreneurship.
The Bayh-Doyle Act expedited the commercialization of
inventions by giving research institutions ownership interests
physicians and researchers believe themselves to be “impervious to industry
influence” despite the literature indicating that gifts trigger an “unconscious
and unintentional” sense of obligation).
144. See Goldner, supra note 141, at 384 (describing budgeting and
compensation processes). A 1996 study of the fifty universities receiving the
highest level of NIH funding reported that 28% of their faculty received
industry funding for research. David Blumenthal et al., Participation of LifeScience Faculty in Research Relationships with Industry, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1734, 1734 (1996). More recent data reports that industry funds for
research in universities increased by 875% between 1980 and 2000. Trudo
Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring Scientific Integrity to the
Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641, 645 (2004) (citing
SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF
PROFIT CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 79–81 (2003)). Elite universities
have experienced significant increases. For example, industry funding
contributes 31% of the overall budget at Duke University. The University of
Texas reported an increase in private funding of 735%, and the University of
California at San Francisco, 491%. Id.
145. U.S. universities are not alone in relying on industry funding.
Between 2002 and 2004, for example, industry funding to McMaster
University in Canada reportedly quadrupled from $34 million to nearly $129
million. Steve Buist et al., Risks, Rewards & Research; Blind Faith—Part 1 of
5, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, June 25, 2005, at A01. In addition, 15.5% of the
full-time faculty had “financial connections” to pharmaceutical and
biotechnology firms. Id. At the same time, pharmaceutical funding for
research at the University of Toronto, one of the elite research universities in
Canada, declined to less than 10% of the University’s total research funding.
Id.
146. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
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in the fruits of their government-funded research. 147 In a 2000
study, 124 of 183 institutions that were members of the
Association of University Technology Managers reported that
they held equity interests in businesses engaged in research at
the university. 148 Start-up companies, like those stimulated by
Bayh-Dole and often jointly owned by research faculty and
their university-employers, have been associated with delays in
publication of study results and resistance to sharing
results, 149 mirroring the issues concerning sponsor control of
research discussed above.
At a minimum, then, rules
applicable to “industry” should not be restricted only to large,
for-profit pharmaceutical firms, but should also consider the
smaller start-ups owned by research faculty and the
universities themselves. Moreover, the narrow target of the
JAMA policy exemplifies another attempt to make the
challenge to clinical research more manageable by drawing
boundaries that lack a grounding in reality.
E. THE PRACTICE GAP
Industry influence is not the only issue affecting the utility
of clinical trials for prescribing decisions. Critics of the current
state of clinical research focus on faults in the design of studies
that have little or nothing to do with industry sponsorship and
conflicts of interest. For example, current studies of health
outcomes in clinical trials frequently suffer from two forms of
design flaws. First, many clinical studies rely on observation
and self-reporting as the primary tool for evaluating
effectiveness. 150 Although these tools are unavoidable in some
147. See generally Clovia Hamilton, University Technology Transfer and
Economic Development: Proposed Cooperative Economic Development Under
the Bayh-Dole Act, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397 (2003); Gary Pulsinelli, Share
and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under
the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393 (2006).
148. AUTM, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY, FY 1999: SURVEY SUMMARY 17
(Lori Pressman ed., 2000), available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/
Surveys/99AUTMLicSurveyPublic.pdf.
149. David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic
Life Science: Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224,
1227 (1997); Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics:
Evidence from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 479 (2002); Joel Lexchin,
The Secret Things Belong Unto the Lord Our God: Secrecy in the
Pharmaceutical Arena, 26 Med. & L. 417, 421 (2007) (reviewing data on
suppression of research results in academia).
150. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1627.
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circumstances they tend to suffer from bias. 151 Second, most
clinical trials are not designed with the clinical decisionmaking process in mind. In order to remedy this latter
problem, some have recommended encouraging “pragmatic” or
“practical” clinical trials (PCTs). PCTs are targeted toward
producing information needed for clinical decision making. 152
These studies compare clinically relevant interventions, feature
a diverse population of study participants, recruit practitioners
from a variety of settings, and collect data on a broad range of
health outcomes. 153 PCTs should also include patients from
high-risk populations and must use diagnostic indicators that
are commonly used in practice, which may be less definitive
than other more sophisticated but less available diagnostic
tools. 154 Researchers should also select patients who replicate
the typical clinical population in terms of history of medication
and of preexisting medical conditions, characteristics that are
typically excluded in clinical trials. 155 In addition, the studies
should compare effectiveness, cost, and safety among available
drugs and between medications and non-pharmaceutical
therapies. 156 Finally, clinical trials with relevancy for clinical
decision making should account for variations in the quality of
physician skills, since this may have a substantial impact on
151. See, e.g., Ellen T. Chang et al., Reliability of Self-Reported Family
History of Cancer in a Large Case-Control Study of Lymphoma, 98 J. NAT’L
CANCER INST. 61, 61 (2006) (concluding that recall bias may produce biased
results in studies of familial cancer risk), available at http://jnci.
oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/98/1/61; Y. Fukuoka et al., Systematic Bias
in Self-Reported Annual Household Incomes Among Unpartnered Elderly
Cardiac Patients, 20 APPLIED NURSING RES. 205, 205 (2007) (concluding that
there is “potential systematic bias regarding self-reporting of annual
household income” with implications for studies of the impact of income).
152. Martin Roland & David J. Torgerson, What are Pragmatic Trials?, 316
BRIT. MED. J. 285, 285 (1998); Daniel Schwartz & Joseph Lellouch,
Explanatory and Pragmatic Attitudes in Therapeutic Trials, 20 J. CHRONIC
DISEASE 637, 639 (1967).
153. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1626.
154. Id.
155. Margaret A. Handley et al., Navigating the Terrain Between Research
and Practice: A Collaborative Research Network (CRN) Case Study in Diabetes
Research, 19 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 85, 89 (2006), available at http:// www.
jabfm.org/cgi/content/full/19/1/85 (noting need to test “whether research
findings from homogenous populations . . . are generalizable to more diverse
ones such as those encountered in ‘real world’ practices”); Office of Inspector
General, supra note 9, at 14.
156. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1626.
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the effectiveness of a therapy. 157
Removing or regulating conflicts of interest in research will
not stimulate more clinically-useful design. Furthermore, offlabel prescribing and other treatment decisions confront
serious quantity and timeliness issues in clinical knowledge.
Several experts, for example, have noted that current clinical
research endeavors are not producing “an adequate supply of
information to meet the needs of clinicians and health policy
decision makers.” 158 The lack of a clinically focused research
agenda reduces the effectiveness of practice guidelines, which
lack clear and specific recommendations, 159 and hampers
payers attempting to make scientifically grounded coverage
decisions with serious implications for substantive controls on
off-label prescribing. 160 One cannot explain this insufficiency
by financial conflicts of interest. In fact, restrictions on
industry funding of research are likely to diminish the
production of necessary clinical knowledge. 161
Widespread concern for the credibility and reliability of
clinical research in pharmaceuticals is apparent, but the
solution is not. The conflict-of-interest framework, especially to
the extent that it relies on disclosure, does not effectively
respond to the issue of the quality of particular articles. It
merely raises a nonspecific warning flag on the data that is
often countered by the peer-review “seal of approval” for
published studies. Counterintuitively, the warning flag may
actually decrease sensitivity to conflicts of interest by creating
a false impression of trustworthiness, as such disclosures have
in the clinical setting, 162 or conversely by reducing such
disclosures to background chatter because of the pervasiveness
of industry support for clinical trials. Efforts to assure that
pharmaceutical firms do not cook the data or misinterpret the
results of a trial are completely justifiable. Exhorting them to
voluntarily select and fund studies that do not contribute to or
that may undermine their competitive position is probably
futile, except in situations where harm to patient safety is at
157. See id. at 1627.
158. Id. at 1625 (citations omitted); see also Soumerai, supra note 28, at
142 (referencing the gap in timeliness and noting that “drug cost containment
policy making often cannot wait for good evidence”).
159. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1625.
160. Id.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 72–81, 104.
162. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text.
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issue and legal, reputational, and even moral concerns are
more acute. Other options for increasing the volume of postapproval clinical research beyond that required for safety
surveillance typically require accounting for the cost of such
research somewhere. 163
Although the conflicts-of-interest tool addresses one aspect
of imperfection in prescribing information, it does so only
roughly. In addition, it does not contribute to stimulating the
conduct of Phase IV trials, and may instead actually depress
the development of post-marketing research. Finally, the
conflicts-of-interest approach does not provide a reliable
method for distinguishing between appropriate and
inappropriate prescribing.
PART III: FALSE CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION AND OFFLABEL PRESCRIBING
Over the past three years, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
has enjoyed tremendous success in pursuing False Claims Act
actions against pharmaceutical firms relating to off-label
prescribing and post-approval relationships with prescribing
physicians. 164 The $430 million settlement and guilty plea by
the manufacturer of a single drug, Neurontin, ranks as one of
the most significant DOJ victories.
The Neurontin-style litigation, whether hailed as “the best
hope for short-term reform” 165 or condemned as “inefficient”
and “overly-aggressive,” 166 is most often viewed as a
163. See, e.g., Daniel Carpenter, A Proposal for Financing Postmarketing
Drug Safety Studies by Augmenting FDA User Fees, HEALTH AFF., Web
Exclusive, Oct. 18, 2005. The FDAAA of 2007 increased user fees. Pub. L. No.
110-85 § 302, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.); see also discussion of the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act,
supra note 24–26, which uses extended market exclusivity to compensate
firms for testing approved drugs in post-approval clinical trials with children.
164. See supra, note 11; see also Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral
Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of
Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 283–84 (2007) (describing
magnitude of government litigation efforts in this context).
165. David J. Rothman, Strong Medicine, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 2004,
at 36.
166. Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices:
Balancing Public Health and Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond
Regulation Through Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH L. 235, 264 (2006); see also
Ralph Hall & Robert Berlin, When You Have a Hammer, Everything Looks
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dramatization of financial conflicts of interest in research and
clinical decision making fueled by pharmaceutical industry
It certainly is that.
practices relating to prescribing. 167
Although never formally resolved by verdict or final
judgment, 168 the evidence strongly suggests that ParkeDavis, 169 the defendant manufacturer of Neurontin, had used
both educational and research efforts as vehicles to market the
drug aggressively for off-label uses. 170
Other insights emerge, however, when the course of the
litigation and settlement are set parallel to contemporaneous
and subsequent patterns of off-label prescribing for Neurontin.
Viewed in that context, the difficulties that arise in evaluating
whether a particular off-label prescription is itself actually a
“false claim” or in some other fashion inappropriate come into a
Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61
FOOD DRUG L.J. 653, 653 (2006).
167. See The Indictment of Pharma Industry Marketing Practices,
INTERNAL MED. ALERT, Oct. 15, 2006; Valerie Jablow, Lawsuits Fault OffLabel Use of Neurontin in Suicide Cases, TRIAL, NOV. 2004 at 12, 12–14.
168. It is unlikely that pharmaceutical defendants in fraud and abuse
prosecutions will proceed to trial for a final judgment of violation of the
statutes, as a 1996 federal statute provides that a Medicare or Medicaid
provider found guilty of such violations must be excluded from those
programs. Thomas S. Crane et al., Congress Strengthens Anti-Fraud and
Abuse Juggernaut, 5 HEALTH L. REP. 37, 37 (Sept. 19, 1996); Edward P.
Lansdale, Used As Directed? How Prosecutors are Expanding the False Claims
Act to Police Pharmaceutical Off-Label Marketing, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 159
(2006). In fact, in the Neurontin settlement, Parke-Davis pled guilty of
violations only for behavior prior to 1996, apparently to avoid exclusion from
these reimbursement programs.
169. Parke-Davis was the named defendant at the initiation of this
litigation. This article refers to the defendant firm as Parke-Davis even though
Warner-Lambert was the signatory for the settlement. Parke-Davis was a
division of Warner-Lambert at that time. Warner Lambert merged with Pfizer
in 2000. Pfizer agreed to a corporate compliance program for Warner-Lambert
as part of the 2004 settlement agreement. For a lineage of the relationship
among these firms, see http://www.pfizer.com/about/history/2000_present.jsp.
170. Michael A. Steinman et al., Narrative Review: The Promotion of
Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 284, 285–88 (2006) (analyzing internal Parke-Davis
documents concerning activities relating to prescribing of Neurontin and
concluding that continuing medical education and research were used to
promote Neurontin but noting that the documents were supplied by the
relator’s attorneys). Interestingly, three of the authors of that article served
as unpaid expert witnesses in the litigation, a fact that is acknowledged within
the text of the article, but is not revealed in the head material for the article.
Phil Kabler, Marketing Predated Firm’s Purchase, Pfizer Says, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Aug. 23, 2006, at 3C.
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sharper focus. Furthermore, the disreputable connotation of
“off-label” as non-scientific or fraudulent is challenged by the
subsequent FDA approval of Neurontin for particular
indications that had become quite popular while in their “offlabel” stage and were, in fact, listed among the uses for which
prescriptions were false claims. 171 The discussion of the case,
thus, highlights the deficiencies in current forms of clinical
research, 172 both in making prescribing decisions and in
regulating those decisions. The case illustrates quite sharply
the importance of appreciating the issue of off-label prescribing
as more than simply an issue of inappropriate financial
relationships in medicine and the challenge of regulating offlabel prescribing in light of medical ways of knowing and
learning.
Government regulation of pharmaceutical industry
activities in post-approval marketing and funding research has
been weak. 173 Provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
171. See infra text accompanying note 241; see Lansdale, supra note 168, at
159.
172. See discussion in Part III.
173. For a comprehensive overview of laws governing post-approval
marketing of off-label uses for approved drugs, see Stephanie Greene, False
Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products, 110
PENN. ST. L. REV. 41 (2005). Private efforts to set boundaries on appropriate
behavior in relationships between industry and researchers/prescribers have
been increasing. In addition to the journal policies discussed earlier,
professional medical societies, including the AMA, and the drug industry trade
association (PhRMA), have issued guidelines for relationships between
prescribers and the companies. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS E-8.06:
PRESCRIBING AND DISPENSING DRUGS AND DEVICES (2002), available at http://
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8483.html; CODE ON INTERACTIONS
WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS (PhRMA 2004), available at http:// www.
phrma.org/files/PhRMA%20Code.pdf; see also AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY
PHYSICIANS, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE TIES AFFECTING FORMULARY
CHOICES AND DRUG SUBSTITUTION (1998, revised 2004), available at http://
www.aafp.org/online/en/home/policy/policies/d/drugs.html.
The Office of
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services has
recommended compliance with the private PhRMA guidelines “as a good
starting point for compliance purposes.” 67 Fed. Reg. 62,057, 62,063 (Oct. 3,
2002). A few private universities also have established their own policies
restricting or prohibiting particular marketing and educational activities on
the part of pharmaceutical firms. Stanford University Medical Center, for
example, enacted a new policy on October 1, 2006, which prohibits physicians
from accepting industry gifts, including drug samples, anywhere on the
medical center campus or at off-site clinical facilities. The policy further bars
“pharmaceutical, bio-device and related industry representatives from patient
care areas and medical school facilities except for in-service training on
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restrict, 174 but do not entirely prohibit, post-approval
marketing of approved drugs for off-label uses. In addition,
court decisions concerning the constitutional boundaries on the
authority of the agency to confine commercial speech have
hampered aggressive enforcement of these provisions. 175
Furthermore, the FDA largely relies on voluntary compliance
with its marketing restrictions and has devoted only limited
resources to post-approval marketing surveillance. 176 Some
have argued that the FDA’s relative inactivity in this arena is
not due to regulatory philosophy or to limitations in resources
but rather is due to the influence of pharmaceutical
interests. 177 Although some states have enacted statutes to
address issues in the marketing of drugs, these efforts are
relatively new and undeveloped and rely primarily on
disclosure mechanisms. 178
Federal
agencies
also
regulate
post-approval
pharmaceutical research efforts through the mechanisms that
govern research with human subjects generally. 179 These
devices and equipment and by appointment only, as well as allowing industry
support of educational activities only under well-regulated conditions.” New
Stanford Medical Center Policy Limits Drug Company Access and Gifts, MED.
DEVICES (Oct. 15, 2006), available at http://med.stanford.edu/news_releases/.
174. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2000 & Supp. IV
2005).
175. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51
(D.D.C. 1998). The Washington Legal Foundation has established a project
called “FDA/DDMAC Watch” through which it challenges FDA interventions
in post-approval marketing. See http://www.wlf.org/Resources/DDMAC/ (last
visited 9/28/06); see Nicole Endejann, Is the FDA’s Nose Growing?: The FDA
Does Not “Exaggerate Its Overall Place in the Universe” When Regulating
Speech Incident to “Off-Label” Prescription Drug Labeling and Advertising, 35
AKRON L. REV. 491, 505 (2002); David M. Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil,
Harm the Patient? Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less,
Speech From Drug Manufacturers on Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST.
U. J. MED. & L. 315, 334 (2005).
176. See Zalesky, supra note 166, at 257 (describing the FDA’s policy of
voluntary compliance and limited staff devoted to all advertising and
marketing issues of approved drugs).
177. David Rothman notes that the OIG, in contrast to the FDA, seems to
be “oddly . . . immune to political pressure as they try to rein in drug
companies.” Rothman, supra note 165, at 36.
178. See Zalensky, supra note 166, at 253; see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 48-833.01
(2004).
179. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.101–.409 (regulating research funded by the
Department of Health and Human Services); 21 C.F.R. § 50.1–50.56
(regulating research funded by the FDA or which will be submitted to the FDA
in relation to agency action). These requirements have a broader reach than
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regulations, often called the “Common Rule” because they have
been promulgated in similar form by several federal agencies to
govern private and public research that arises in the scope of
their work, focus on protecting the individuals who participate
These regulations
as subjects in research protocols. 180
generally delegate enforcement of the protective standards to
the private research organization or university itself with only
a second front of government oversight that has varied over
time in its activity level. Several of the agencies, including the
FDA, that share this “Common Rule” have issued guidance or
regulations concerning financial relationships between
researchers and sponsors, including sponsors of pharmaceutical
research. 181 Essentially, these conflicts-of-interest regulations
rely on the same delegation to private research organizations
that characterizes the “Common Rule” generally. The conflictsof-interest guidance or regulations require that the research
organization have a written policy; that researchers disclose
conflicts of interest to the research organization; that the
organization operate an internal review mechanism; and that
the organization manage, reduce or eliminate conflicts of
interest, as appropriate. 182 Guidance on conflicts of interest in
research from the Department of Health and Human Services
is even more general, and consists mostly of questions and
points that the institution might consider in implementing an
internal conflict-of-interest policy, while the FDA provides for
agency evaluation of financial interest disclosures that exceed
indicated in the regulations themselves as research universities typically
agree to apply the federal regulations to all research conducted within the
university or by university employees. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at
107.
180. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 106.
181. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 54.4 (FDA); 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (HHS). Conflictsof-interest regulation is justified as an element of protecting the subjects of
research for two reasons. First, research with human subjects must provide
benefits that outweigh the risks of the studies; and to the extent that conflicts
of interest may compromise the validity or usefulness of the results, they may
alter the risk-benefit calculus. Second, conflicts of interest may lead to
overaggressive enrollment of individuals with inattention to consent or
exclusion criteria.
182. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2006); 68 Fed. Reg. 15,456-01 (Mar. 31, 2003); see,
e.g., Harrington supra note 96, at 793; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: MOST FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED TO PROTECT AGAINST
FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE RICHARD C.
SHELBY, U.S. SENATE 17 (2003).
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statutory thresholds. 183
In contrast to the limitations imposed upon or adopted by
the FDA in regulating industry-prescriber interactions, the
DOJ and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the
Department of Health and Human Services have adopted an
aggressive litigation strategy to regulate industry postapproval marketing and clinical research funding, especially as
these relate to off-label prescribing. In fact, the OIG has
identified industry-prescriber relationships as a primary target
for enforcement efforts. 184 The DOJ and OIG wield an assault
weapon in the form of civil and criminal enforcement of
statutes designed to protect the government’s financial
interests in public programs, 185 such as Medicare and
Medicaid, and to establish boundaries on post-approval
marketing and funding of research by pharmaceutical firms. 186
This high-profile litigation strategy is currently the primary
“regulatory” effort for off-label marketing, industry-funded
clinical trials, and prescribing.
The Neurontin litigation
discussed in this section is the most notable episode in this
effort.
The FDA approved Neurontin (gabapentin) in 1994 for use
Shortly after its
as adjunctive therapy for epilepsy. 187
approval, physicians were prescribing Neurontin as a
183. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 54.4 (2007). FDA regulations
require that applicants for FDA action submit either a certification that
investigators of submitted studies do not have conflicts of interest or a
disclosure statement that discloses the investigator’s financial interests that
do exist. For investigators disclosing such financial interests, the FDA
evaluates the nature of the interests and the steps that have been taken to
eliminate “bias created by a disclosable financial interest.”
184. Lansdale, supra note 168, at 180; Marc J. Scheineson and Shannon T.
Klinger, Lessons From Expanded Government Enforcement Efforts Against
Drug Companies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 1 (2005); Robert Brady et al.,
Pharmaceutical Companies Have Been Penalized for Pushing Their Products
for Unapproved Uses, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 20, 2006 (detailing recent actions and
settlements); see also supra note 11.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2000) (anti-kickback statute); 31 U.S.C. §
3729–33 (2000) (false claims act).
186. Although this article focuses on pharmaceuticals, similar issues have
arisen in the promotion of medical devices. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, WhistleBlower Suit Says Device Maker Generously Rewards Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
24, 2006, at C1; see also United States ex rel. Gilligan v. Medtronic, Inc., 403
F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2005).
187. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45
(D. Mass. 2001); see also Neurontin, in PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2462
(2008).
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monotherapy for epilepsy; for pain control for a large number of
pain states, including post-herpetic neuropathy; for bipolar
disorder; for attention deficit disorder; for ALS; for migraine;
for restless leg syndrome; for sleep disorders; and for a variety
of other uses. 188 In fact, in 1995, one year after approval of
Neurontin, 40% of the prescriptions written for the medication
were for off-label indications. 189
The Neurontin litigation began when Dr. David Franklin, a
medical liaison employed by Parke-Davis, filed a qui tam action
in 1996. In his lawsuit, Franklin alleged that Parke-Davis
illegally incentivized physicians to write prescriptions for
Neurontin which would be paid for by government medical
payment programs, including Medicare, Medicaid and
Veterans’ Administration programs. Franklin argued, among
other theories, that these prescriptions amounted to false
claims against the government in violation of the False Claims
Act.
Defendant Parke-Davis filed a motion to dismiss Franklin’s
claims on several grounds, but were largely unsuccessful in
regard to claims relating to Neurontin. 190 Parke-Davis argued
that it had not filed a single claim for reimbursement from any
governmental entity for prescriptions for Neurontin. It argued
that because only physicians can prescribe, it was only the
188. Lansdale, supra note 168, at 159.
189. Julie Schmit, Drugmaker Admitted Fraud, But Sales Flourish, USA
TODAY, Aug. 17, 2004, at 1A. Prescribing patterns for Neurontin during the
litigation and after the settlement are described infra at text accompanying
notes 225–229.
190. The court did dismiss the relator’s claims relating to Accupril, another
drug produced by Parke-Davis for insufficient specificity in pleading. Franklin,
147 F. Supp. 2d at 50. The court also dismissed the claims relating to
violation of the anti-kickback statute. Id. at 54. The court in a later opinion
denied the relator’s motion to amend its pleadings on this particular claim,
commenting that the relator’s new theory “may well be viable,” but that the
delay in filing the motion to amend would prejudice the defendant. United
States ex rel. Franklin v. Pfizer, No. Civ. A. 96-11651, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5761, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2002). The court granted the defendant’s motion
to dismiss the relator’s count for false claims against the Veterans’
Administration for Neurontin prescriptions for lack of the required specificity
in pleading, but denied the motion in relation to the Medicaid program.
Franklin, 147 F.Supp.2d at 49–50. The standards for specificity in pleading
false claims actions of this sort may have heightened since this decision. See,
e.g., United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 6 (D. Mass. 2006);
see also United States ex rel. McDermott v. Genentech, 2006 WL 3741920 at
*10–*12 (D. Me. Dec. 14, 2006).
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physicians who had filed a claim, whether false or not. 191 The
doctors, according to Parke-Davis, were an “intervening force”
and as such the necessary causal link between its own behavior
and the false claims was missing. According to the court,
however, the doctors’ actions were foreseeable and were, in fact,
the “intended consequence of the alleged scheme of fraud,”
satisfying the requirement of causation. 192
Parke-Davis also argued that the False Claims Act could
not be used to enforce the FDCA’s restrictions on promotion of
approved drugs for off-label uses. The court rejected this
argument holding that violation of the anti-promotion
provisions of the FDCA could be pursued under the False
Claims Act if the violation of the FDCA “amounts to a material
misrepresentation made to obtain a government benefit.” 193 In
the view of the court, the False Claims Act simply provided
tools not available to the FDA, including civil money damages
and private enforcement, for the enforcement of its restrictions
on promotion of off-label uses. 194
The court contended with two central issues in applying
false claims standards to Parke-Davis’s marketing efforts.
First, while particular activities, such as discussing off-label
uses without an initial physician inquiry, may formally violate
the FDCA restrictions on marketing, can those communications
properly be considered false claims unless the representations
themselves are inaccurate or false? Second, if the nonapproved indications for which the drug is marketed and
prescribed are legitimate uses covered by the federal payment
program, can they be false claims by virtue of their status as
off-label or by the very fact that the firm had marketed these
off-label uses to doctors?
The court rejected the firm’s argument that off-label
promotions, even when in violation of the FDCA, are not per se
false statements within the meaning of the False Claims Act.
The court rejected this argument, apparently relying on the
relator’s claims in this particular case that the firm knowingly
made false statements about the drug’s performance. 195 The
191. This defense mimics the “learned intermediary” defense that has been
available to pharmaceutical manufacturers in products liability suits.
192. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
193. Id. at 51.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 52.
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court in this opinion, however, stated that “[a] much closer
question would be presented if the allegations involved only the
unlawful—yet truthful—promotion of off-label uses . . . .” 196
In considering Parke-Davis’s later submission of a motion
for summary judgment, however, the court revisited the issue
of whether truthful information provided to physicians, but still
an illegal promotion under the FDCA, could form the root of a
In this later unpublished
false claim for prescribing. 197
opinion, the court concluded that defendant’s “non-fraudulent”
promotion of Neurontin for off-label uses could, indeed, result
in a false claim, but only if the Medicaid program did not cover
the off-label uses at issue. 198 Thus, there would be no false
claim in the case of non-fraudulent promotional efforts that
nonetheless violated the FDCA if the state Medicaid program
covered the specific off-label prescriptions at issue. 199
According to the court’s opinion ruling on the firm’s motion
to dismiss, Parke-Davis did not “dispute that an off-label
prescription submitted for reimbursement by Medicaid is a
false claim” in its motion to dismiss the qui tam action. 200
196. Id.
197. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Pfizer, No. Civ. A. 96-11651, 2002 WL
32128635, at *1 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2002).
198. Standards for coverage of prescriptions for off-label uses under
Medicaid is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 252–257.
199. United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., No. 4; 05CV570,
2006 WL 1064127, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2006), the court interprets the
earlier Parke-Davis decision (147 F. Supp. 2d 30) as requiring that the
information provided to doctors by the pharmaceutical firm concerning offlabel uses be “false information” in order to support a claim under the False
Claims Act. In Hess, the court dismissed the qui tam action against the
defendant pharmaceutical firm because the information on the drug’s
performance for the off-label use was “at most, immature, unreliable and
misleading,” but not false. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., 2006 WL 1064127, at *9;
see also United States ex rel. McDermott v. Genentech, 2006 WL 3741920 at
*13 (D. Me. Dec. 14, 2006), dismissing relator’s qui tam False Claims Act claim
relating to defendant’s promotion of off-label use of a biological product in part
because the off-label use was reimbursable under Medicaid as that use was
listed in one of the statutory compendia despite evidence that Genentech had
pursued an aggressive marketing campaign that included allegations of
ghostwriting of journal articles.
Hess and Genentech raise significant
questions about the continued viability of qui tam actions relating to off-label
promotion and certainly challenge the extensive reach of the standards used in
Parke-Davis. They do not necessarily diminish the ability of the DOJ to get
settlements for government claims regarding the same behaviors, however.
See supra note 168.
200. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
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Even though Parke-Davis apparently did not dispute this
proposition at that point in this litigation, it is not an accurate
statement of the law. It is well-established that Medicaid
programs must cover off-label prescriptions under certain
circumstances. 201 Under the Medicaid program, prescription
drugs are not covered if the drugs are prescribed “for a medical
indication which is not a medically accepted indication.” 202 An
off-label or unapproved use, however, can be a “medically
accepted indication” under the Medicaid statute if the off-label
indication is included in one of the drug compendia listed in the
federal statute. 203 The court in its opinion denying the motion
to dismiss states that none of the off-label uses at issue in the
litigation were listed in any of the compendia during the time
covered by the lawsuit. 204 In its later opinion denying ParkeDavis’s subsequent motion for summary judgment, however,
the District Court further studied the question of whether the
off-label uses of Neurontin were covered by Medicaid, at this
point viewed by the court as a key question in whether a False
Claims Act action for promotion of off-label uses would survive.
In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued
that forty-two state Medicaid programs covered “off-label, noncompendium” prescriptions. 205 While the court does not resolve
whether states, in fact, have such latitude under the federal
Medicaid statute, it concludes that at least eight states did not
provide coverage for off-label, non-compendium prescriptions
and that, at least as to those states, the False Claims Act
claims could survive. The court holds that the defendant’s
argument thus goes to the amount of damages rather than to
whether there are sufficient facts to support a claim. 206
201. See, e.g., Weaver v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989); see infra text
accompanying notes 245–250.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(10) (2000).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(6) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
204. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 45. Several of the off-label uses at issue
in this case were also at issue in subsequent litigation relating to Medicaid
coverage of Neurontin for off-label uses. At least at the time of the latter case,
the off-label indications were listed in some of the compendia. See infra
discussion at notes 246–249.
205. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. Civ.A. 96-11651,
2003 WL 22048255, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003). Medicaid is a joint federalstate program in which the federal statute and regulations provide a
framework and minimums for coverage, allowing the states discretion on
particular items.
206. Id. at *3.
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The Department of Justice, which had monitored the
Neurontin litigation from its filing by the private relator, 207
took an active role in the litigation after the District Court’s
rulings denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion
for summary judgment. 208 Once it entered the case, the DOJ
resurrected the allegation of false claims against the Veterans’
Administration, 209 which had been dismissed by the trial judge.
In addition, state attorneys general joined the action to file
claims to recover the payments made by their states under the
federal-state Medicaid program as well as claims under state
consumer protection statutes. 210
The DOJ characterized Parke-Davis’s actions as “a
widespread, coordinated national effort to implement an offlabel marketing plan.” 211 As is often the case in qui tam
litigation, internal communications provided the interpretive
framework or narrative for the government’s suit. First, a
Parke-Davis marketing executive allegedly told the company’s
medical liaisons that the FDA-approved use for Neurontin “is
not where the money is. I want you out there every day selling
Neurontin” for off-label uses. 212 In addition, an advertising
firm working for the company produced a report entitled “1998
Neurontin Tactics” which recommended that the company hold
educational programs on the use of Neurontin for bi-polar
disorder and other off-label uses of the drug. 213
207. The district court notes that the suit was “in limbo” from its filing in
1996 until 1999 “while the United States mulled over its option to intervene.”
Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d. at 46.
208. In the 2003 proceeding, the federal government had filed only a
“statement of interest” and had not yet intervened. Franklin, 2003 WL
22048255, at *1.
209. Department of Justice, supra note 5.
210. See, e.g., Rubel v. Pfizer, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
Many of the states that received funds through the settlement agreement used
a portion of the proceeds to support programs on physician prescribing
practices. See, e.g., Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General
Myers Announces Prescription Drug Education Grants (Nov. 1, 2006),
available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2006/rel110106.shtml.
211. Department of Justice, supra note 5; see also Steinman et al., supra
note 170 (concluding that Parke-Davis’s educational and research efforts were
both part of the marketing plan for Neurontin).
212. Douglas McLeod, Lawsuits Mount Over Marketing of Epilepsy Drug,
BUS. INS., June 14, 2004, at 3.
213. CLINE ET AL., 1998 NEURONTIN TACTICS 5932, available at
http://dida.library.ucsf.edu/pdf/ida00a10.
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Particular educational/marketing activities alleged by the
DOJ to be illegal included encouraging sales representatives to
pitch off-label use without a prior inquiry from the physician in
violation of FDA standards for post-approval marketing. 214
The Department also challenged the company’s sponsorship of
continuing medical education.
Parke-Davis sponsored
“independent medical education” events, as do most
pharmaceutical companies. In this case, however, the DOJ
alleged that Parke-Davis as sponsor selected the topics,
speakers, and content of the programs and planted questions
from the floor to assure that the drug would be showcased as it
desired. In addition, Parke-Davis conducted teleconferences in
which physicians discussed their experience in prescribing
Neurontin for off-label uses, with the company paying
physician-speakers as well as paying doctors enrolled in the
teleconference for their time. 215 The DOJ further alleged that
Parke-Davis representatives made misleading statements
about the efficacy of the drug for particular purposes.216
The evidence, as presented by the relator and the DOJ,
also indicates that the firm’s funding of post-approval clinical
research on off-label uses for Neurontin was a part of the
marketing effort. The government and the relator alleged that
doctors participating in study protocols for Neurontin received
substantial payments for enrolling their patients in the
protocol while having minimal obligations for data collection or
analysis. 217 In addition, the clinical trials often were open
label, (where doctor and patient were aware of which drug was
being used) a study design generally viewed as inferior to
random controlled trials especially where measures of
improvement rely on patient self-reporting. The OIG had
specifically expressed concerns about these and similar
structural practices in post-marketing clinical research in a
214. This activity actually may be protected. Washington Legal Foundation
v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Greene, supra note
173, at 50.
215. See Steinman et al., supra note 170, at 286; see also EPSTEIN supra
note 7, at 154 ([For doctors,] “time is money, and any hour spent gathering
information about new drugs is an hour away from some other part of their
practice . . . . Many of these promotional efforts at wining and dining are
understood in part as efforts to cover the opportunity cost of time.”).
216. The Justice Department singled out the promotion of Neurontin for
“bipolar disease” and “monotherapy for epileptic seizure.” Department of
Justice, supra note 5.
217. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 54 (D. Mass. 2001).
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1994 Fraud Alert. 218 Finally, Parke-Davis originated the
grants and protocols in their marketing department rather
than in their research department, a practice that the
government identified as “suspect activity” in OIG guidance
issued after the initiation of the lawsuit but before the
settlement. 219
In 2004, Parke-Davis entered into a settlement with the
federal and state governments. Parke-Davis paid $152 million
plus interest to reimburse both the federal ($83.6 million) and
the state ($68.4 million) governments for off-label prescriptions
for Neurontin paid for by the state-federal Medicaid program.
The company also settled state consumer protection claims for
$38 million plus interest. The company also accepted a
mandatory corporate compliance program. Finally, the firm
pled guilty to the charge that some of its post-approval
communications with physicians violated the restrictions of the
FDCA and, therefore, violated the False Claims Act. ParkeDavis paid a criminal fine of $240 million for this violation.
The qui tam relator recovered an additional $24.64 million
from the firm as part of the settlement as well. 220
In all, Parke-Davis paid over $455 million to the
government parties and to the relator, the largest settlement
for such litigation to that date. 221 The settlement also spawned
several subsequent class action lawsuits against Parke-Davis
by private insurers, including Aetna and the Teamsters, and by
self-insured employers to recover what the insurance plans had

218. Special Fraud Alert: Prescription Drug Marketing Schemes, 59 Fed.
Reg. 65,376 (Aug. 1994).
219. OIG
Compliance
Program
Guidance
for
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 237,131 (May 5, 2003).
220. Department of Justice, supra note 5; see Matthew, supra note 164, at
284 for discussion of qui tam relators in pharmaceutical cases.
221. An earlier federal criminal investigation of TAP Pharmaceutical
Products, Inc., resulted in a guilty plea and payment of approximately
$875,000,000 by TAP in 2001. The issues in the TAP litigation did not involve
off-label prescribing, but focused instead on TAP’s pricing practices for
Medicare reimbursement as well as marketing practices. Press Release,
Department of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others
Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to
Settle Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/
October/513civ.htm. Pricing was not involved in the Neurontin litigation. For
discussion of subsequent acquittal of TAP executives, see Matthew, supra note
164, at 309–14.
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paid for off-label prescriptions for Neurontin 222 as well as
products liability and consumer protection claims by patients
themselves. 223
The DOJ and Parke-Davis disagreed over whether the
firm’s activities fell within the ambit of the False Claims Act
both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact. The DOJ,
however, produced significant evidence that the firm’s activities
crossed over into suspect practices, including practices that the
government had identified earlier as potential fraud; and
Parke-Davis admitted to certain violations and paid a notably
large settlement for a pharmaceutical case that did not involve
pricing or kickback issues, perhaps in part because of the
overwhelming risk of exclusion from the Medicare program if
the DOJ succeeded in proving its case in court. 224
The “rest of the story” in this instance, however, does not
lie in deciding whether the Department’s narrative or the
defendant’s counter story about the company’s behavior is true,
but rather in what was happening to Neurontin prescribing
during the course of the litigation and thereafter. In 2002, 94%
of Neurontin prescriptions were for off-label indications, up
from 40% in 1995. 225 Neurontin sales amounted to $2.7 billion
in 2003, of which nearly $2.5 billion was for off-label uses. 226
One might expect that Neurontin prescribing patterns
would change as physicians learned of the government’s highprofile attack on off-label prescribing of Neurontin and
allegations of misleading marketing, but that is not the case.
In August, 2004, two years into the state and federal
governments’ pursuit of the lawsuit and shortly after the
attention-grabbing settlement, sales of Neurontin had actually
increased by 32% over the same quarter the year before. 227
222. E.g., In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices and Products
Liability Litigation, 433 F. Supp. 2d 172, 184 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that
plaintiff private insurers stated a claim against the manufacturer under the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)).
223. See, e.g., Rubel v. Pfizer, 276 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 2003);
Dellinger v. Pfizer, No. 5:03CV95, 2006 WL 2057654 (W.D.N.C. July 19, 2006);
Jablow, supra note 167.
224. See supra note 169. In addition, the settlement was actually approved
by Pfizer, Inc., which had acquired Warner-Lambert/Parke-Davis during the
course of this litigation, and Pfizer deflected fault by stating that the activities
“did not involve Pfizer practices or employees.” Kabler, supra note 170.
225. Schmit, supra note 189.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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Lehman Brothers estimated that the great bulk of those
prescriptions for Neurotin—90% of sales, in fact—were still for
off-label uses. 228 In fact, only in 2006 did another medication
surpass sales of Neurontin for neuropathic pain—which was an
off-label use for Neurontin during the course of the litigation
until its approval by the FDA (only as to cases in which
neuropathic pain is associated with shingles) in 2002—and this
was due to the expiration of its patent protection and the
resultant entry of generics. 229
The persistence of off-label prescribing for Neurontin even
after the eye-popping settlement and guilty plea in this case,
could be attributed to the observed persistence of prescribing
habits in physicians described earlier. 230 In other words, once
brand loyalty has been purchased, it continues even after the
flow of money and perquisites stops.
In this case, however, some of the off-label prescribing of
Neurontin actually was good medicine despite the fact that at
the time no rigorous clinical studies supported the uses for
which practicing doctors were prescribing the medication. Offlabel prescribing decisions, even though stimulated by
pharmaceutical detailing, may be justified and may provide
essential care for patients. Apparently, this was the case with
the off-label use of Neurontin for relief of neuropathic pain.
Neuropathic pain is one of the most treatment-resistant
pain conditions that exist.
Such pain is chronic and
debilitating and does not respond to more common pain
medications, including opioids. 231 It is not surprising that
doctors trying to treat patients with neuropathic pain, and the
patients themselves, would be willing to try innovative
therapies to get some relief. So it happened that doctors began
to use Neurontin for neuropathic pain despite the fact that no
rigorous clinical studies supported its use for that purpose.
Patients experienced relief with Neurontin, and Parke-Davis
apparently spread the word to its own benefit, but also to the
benefit of patients in pain. In 2002, the FDA formally approved
228. Id.
229. COMMERCIAL INSIGHT: NEUROPATHIC PAIN—A PLETHORA OF PATIENT
SEGMENTATION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION OPPORTUNITIES 80 (2006).
230. See supra note 58.
231. See, e.g., Steve Simon et al., Breakthrough Pain in Opioid-Treated
Patients with Neuropathic Pain, 2 J. OPIOID MGMT. 347, 347 (2006).
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Neurontin for the treatment of post-herpetic neuropathic pain
(i.e., nerve pain associated with shingles) 232 in the midst of the
Neurontin prosecution. Neurontin has not been approved for
the treatment of neuropathic pain caused by other disease
states, and it will not be. Nor is the drug likely to be subjected
to double-blind, random-controlled clinical trials in persons
suffering neuralgia from other conditions as the patent for the
drug has expired, and generics are taking control of the
market. 233 The absence of clinical trials does not mean that
Neurontin (now generic gabapentin) is not effective in treating
these highly similar pain states just as FDA approval in 2002
did not make the drug effective for treating pain. 234 Nor was
the experience of doctors and patients who observed the pain
relieving effect of Neurontin “false” even though it would be
categorized as “anecdotal.”
The Neurontin litigation was not solely focused on the use
of Neurontin for neuropathic pain, of course.
The DOJ
specifically referenced the promotion of the drug for bipolar
disorder, ALS, attention deficit disorder, migraine, withdrawal
seizures, and restless leg syndrome in addition to “various pain
states” in its statements describing the settlement. 235
Certainly, Neurontin may not be effective in treating all of
these disorders; and surely it is distinctly possible that ParkeDavis representatives exaggerated the evidence regarding
these uses. The now-proven effectiveness of Neurontin for
neuropathic pain (but only that related to shingles) illustrates
one of the challenges in establishing that inappropriate
marketing causes inappropriate and ineffective prescribing. 236
Nearly one-third of the amount paid by Parke-Davis ($152
million plus interest) was paid to the state and federal
governments as reimbursement for payments made for off-label

232. Schmit, supra note 189; see also Neurontin, supra note 187.
233. See Hoover’s, supra note 26 (documenting a 77% decline in revenue
from Neurontin after patent expiration); Department of Justice, supra note 5
(observing that the defendant did not pursue approval of off-label uses because
of the impending expiration of the patent on Neurontin).
234. Steven D. Passik & Kenneth L. Kirsh, Editorial, Weighing in on the
Off-Label Use of Actiq™ for Noncancer-Related Pain: A Recipe for Success or a
Recipe for Disaster?, 8 PAIN MED. 130, 130 (2007) (commenting on the fact that
Actiq is approved only for cancer-related pain and not for pain caused by other
diseases or conditions).
235. Department of Justice, supra note 5.
236. Schmit, supra note 189.
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prescriptions of Neurontin for Medicaid beneficiaries. 237 This
payment signals that the government (as purchaser for the
program’s beneficiaries) did not get what it paid for (i.e.,
effective treatment) when it paid for off-label prescriptions of
Parke-Davis was accused, for example, of
this drug. 238
“steal[ing] from taxpayers” when it promoted off-label uses of
Neurontin. 239 After the settlement, however, Neurontin
continued to be the third highest drug cost for some state
Medicaid programs. 240
It would be reasonable for state Medicaid programs to turn
the False Claims Act litigation, essentially a damning autopsy
of the firm’s behavior, into prospective payment regulation.
Even a year after the settlement produced “re-payments” to the
Medicaid programs for prescriptions written prior to the date of
settlement, however, state Medicaid programs continued to pay
for off-label use of Neurontin without any significant change in
payment standards. 241 If Parke-Davis was required to repay
the Medicaid program for the off-label prescribing it
stimulated, because these prescriptions amounted to false
claims, then why would the state continue to pay for those
same prescriptions after the date of the settlement? The State
of Florida decided it would not do so. 242
In 2004, “following news reports that Neurontin was being
widely prescribed for off-label uses and that reimbursement for
the drug by state Medicaid programs was significant,” the
Florida legislature acted to encourage the state Medicaid
agency to constrain reimbursement for off-label prescriptions of
The legislation specifically authorized the
Neurontin. 243
agency to implement a prior authorization program for “offlabel uses of Medicaid-covered prescribed drugs” that would
require doctors “to provide information about the rational and
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. In fact, over the course of time, private pharmacy benefit managers
also have largely abandoned efforts to restrict off-label prescribing. Nor are
private employer-based health insurance plans refusing to pay for off-label
uses. See discussion supra note 27; Matthew, supra note 164, at 326
(discussing state laws mandating coverage of off-label prescriptions).
242. Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
243. Id.
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supporting medical evidence for the off-label use of the drug.” 244
In July, 2004, the Florida Medicaid agency established a
policy under which it would pay for Neurontin only for its
approved uses (adjunctive therapy for epileptic seizures 245 and
neuropathic pain associated with shingles) and for off-label
uses only when safety and efficacy were proven “by doubleblind, placebo controlled, randomized clinical trials.” 246
However, the agency decided to reimburse for two unapproved
indications for which there were no clinical studies proving the
drug effective. 247 These two uses were the prescription of
Neurontin for ALS, for which the FDA had formally categorized
Neurontin as an “orphan drug,” 248 and for diabetic peripheral
Thus, the agency refused to pay for
neuropathy. 249
prescriptions of Neurontin for any uses other than adjunctive
therapy for epileptic seizures and partial refractory seizures;
for post-herpetic neuropathic pain and diabetic peripheral
It excluded, for example,
neuropathy; and for ALS. 250
prescriptions for Neurontin for the treatment of neuropathic
pain unless the patient had shingles or diabetes. Patients with
neuropathic pain from medical conditions other than shingles
or diabetes filed suit. 251
Florida claimed that its coverage decisions for Neurontin
complied with the federal Medicaid requirement that the state
cover off-label uses that are “supported by one or more

244. Id.
245. Actually, it appears that the agency decided to cover Neurontin for the
unapproved indication of “partial seizure refractory” within this category,
perhaps mistakenly assuming that it was the same use as that approved by
the FDA. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. An orphan drug has not been proven effective, but is categorized as
such because it “might provide a significant benefit” to persons with “serious
or life threatening illness” in which the number of people with the disease is
relatively small (estimated at under 200,000). One of the compendia approved
for use in Medicaid actually reported that Neurontin was “ineffective” for use
with ALS. Id. at 1332.
249. Id. The state also paid for Neurontin for a particular unapproved
treatment for epilepsy. Id. at 1331.
250. Id.
251. Plaintiff Mr. Edmonds, for example, suffered from neuropathy caused
by medications required to treat HIV and had found that Neurontin relieved
this pain after all other medications had failed. Bob Lamendola, State Limits
5 Medicaid Drugs to Save Money, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 5, 2004, at B5.
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citations” 252 in the accepted drug compendia. 253 The American
Hospital Formulary Service Drug Informant (AHFS), an
approved compendium, listed several off-label uses for
Neurontin, including its use for neuropathic and neurogenic
pain resulting from a variety of medical conditions, but did not
provide any citations to studies or journal articles for any of
these uses. 254 Another of the approved compendia, DRUGDEX,
listed fifty-four uses for Neurontin. DRUGDEX classified each
use as “effective, possibly effective, or ineffective” and rated the
available documentation of effectiveness as “excellent, good,
fair, and poor.” 255 All but three of the fifty-four uses listed in
this publication were recognized as either “effective” or
Of the three uses categorized in
“possibly effective.” 256
DRUGDEX as “ineffective,” Florida’s Medicaid program
actually covered two: ALS and a specific manifestation of
epilepsy. 257
The District Court held that the Florida agency’s policy
violated the coverage mandated in the federal Medicaid
program. 258 The court recognized that the state could have
followed other routes within its authority under the federal
Medicaid statute to control Medicaid payments for Neurontin
prescriptions, which would have required case-by-case review

252. The federal statute does not define the word “citation.” Edmonds, 417
F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
253. There are some particular exceptions to this requirement, but the
Florida policy did not fall within any of them. For example, as described by
the court in Edmonds, the state could establish a drug formulary that would
exclude specific drugs and which would require a written justification of the
exclusion by the agency. Under the Medicaid statute, a state with an
exclusionary formulary must have an authorization process in place where a
doctor can submit a request to prescribe the drug, and the state will consider
such requests on a case-by-case basis. Alternatively, the state could require
prior authorization for particular drugs. In such a program, the request is
always granted, but the doctor is required to seek prior authorization, which
allows the state pharmacist to offer other alternatives. Finally, a state can
alert the Secretary of HHS to clinical abuse and overuse of a particular drug;
and the Secretary can choose to list the drug as excluded from Medicaid
coverage. Id. 1327–30. For the adverse impact of these methods of drug
utilization controls, see Kleinke, supra note 28.
254. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1333.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.; see supra notes 245 and 248.
258. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
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for individual patients, 259 but that the method used by the
state violated the statutory mandate. 260
In particular, the court noted that the state’s requirement
that an off-label use would be covered only if it were supported
by “double-blind, placebo-controlled randomized clinical trials”
misinterpreted the statute as “the same standard employed for
FDA-approved uses” and “the equivalent of saying the same
thing twice.” 261 The court said further:
If Congress had intended that “medically accepted indications” must
be supported by double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical
trials, it would have said so . . . . [Amendments of the statutory
provision at issue] over the years substantiate the notion that
Congress intended coverage for off-label uses, many of which would
obviously not be supported by the same strict criteria required for
FDA approval. 262

The core of the injury alleged and recovered for in the
Neurontin litigation was that inappropriate marketing
corrupted medical decision making with the result that the
states paid for unnecessary or ineffective product. 263
Prescription of Neurontin for certain unapproved uses (for
example, for neuropathic pain) did not injure the states in this
fashion. In fact, Medicaid patients receiving the drug for those
purposes received effective and necessary treatment even if the
prescription was off-label, and even if their doctors learned of
this use through firm-sponsored marketing. Although the FDA
has not approved Neurontin for the treatment of neuropathic
pain generated by diseases or injuries other than shingles, it
seems entirely reasonable for physicians to believe that the
drug may be effective for those pain states as well, especially if
patients are reporting positive results.
It was also logical for the Florida Medicaid agency to
address the forward flow of dollars after the Neurontin
settlement. Although the agency was thwarted in this effort by
the federal Medicaid statute, its experience is more
generalizable.
Requiring the completion of “double-blind,
placebo-controlled randomized clinical trials” as a prerequisite
for covering prescriptions for medications for unapproved uses
appeals to the notion of medicine as science, but would have
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See supra note 253.
See Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 238.
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prevented patients in some cases from receiving the only
effective care available. 264
Private insurers have fared no better than the State of
Florida in their attempts to control individual off-label
prescribing decisions, 265 and their challenges have nothing to
do with the Medicaid statute. 266 The hesitancy of private
payers to involve themselves in reining in off-label prescribing
may be a simple matter of administrative convenience. 267 If
their primary concern is to control drug costs, there are less
expensive methods for doing so. 268 These include shifting costs
to consumers through co-pays, tiered benefit systems, prior
authorization requirements, and step therapy (“fail first”)
mechanisms. 269 These are hardly satisfactory as methods for
evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of an off-label
prescription—or any prescription for that matter—because they
erect barriers unrelated to the effectiveness of medications.
There are emerging efforts to constrain prescribing,
especially off-label prescribing, within a rubric of effectiveness
and quality rather than cost control. These efforts face several
significant obstacles discussed in this paper. 270 First, these
efforts must address directly the inadequate quantity and
quality of post-approval research on approved drugs and the
resulting deficiencies in clinical guidelines. Public funding for
such trials is simply inadequate; private funding by
pharmaceutical firms has been made suspect; incentives for
private funding by private insurers are limited when they can
achieve their cost-containment goals through much less
expensive means; and incentives for the insurers to share the
knowledge they produce on other than a proprietary basis are
uncertain. Moreover, if private insurers and pharmacy benefit
264. Of course, the methods for controlling prescribing that are permitted
in the federal Medicaid scheme may also harm patients. See Kleinke, supra
note 28, at 44.
265. See discussion of private efforts supra note 28. The Medicare Part D
program has established standards similar to those of the Medicaid program.
42 C.F.R. 423.100; 70 Fed. Reg. 4194-01 (Jan. 28, 2005).
266. Kleinke, supra note 28, at 41.
267. See id., at 42.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See generally Neumann, Emerging Lessons from the Drug
Effectiveness Review Project, supra note 28; Neumann, Evidence-Based and
Value-Based Formulary Guidelines, supra note 81.

JOHNSON S. POLLUTING MEDICAL JUDGMENT? FALSE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PURSUIT OF FALSE
CLAIMS REGARDING OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2007;9(1):61-124.

2008]

POLLUTING MEDICAL JUDGMENT

123

managers begin to provide serious funding for clinical trials,
who is to say that this funding also will not be viewed as
suspect for the same reasons of self-serving interests that are
now recited for pharmaceutical funding? Second, even if a
robust program of Phase IV clinical trials of expanded uses for
approved drugs does emerge, there will still be the irreducible
clinical uncertainties—uncertainties caused by unavoidable
temporal gaps between the immediacy of clinical decision
making and the slow clock required for trials to be conceived,
designed, and executed as well as uncertainties caused by the
performance of the drug on individual patients.
CONCLUSION
We can view the Neurontin litigation as catching a bad
actor. Certainly, the evidence of Parke-Davis’s marketing,
educational and research practices provides sufficient support
for that view. With that perspective, the litigation simply
dramatizes the conflicts-of-interest narrative of pharmaceutical
firm-prescriber co-dependencies.
The litigation, the persistence of off-label prescribing postlitigation, and the difficulties encountered in translating the
recovery of Medicaid payments into prospective controls raise
broader issues than those that will fit under the conflicts-ofinterest umbrella, however. Conflicts-of-interest regulation,
both public and private, works only at the margins of the issues
raised in this situation. While conflicts-of-interest surveillance
and management may produce some benefits, this approach
can also give a false sense of problem solved even though those
interventions do not reach the core issues of the production and
dissemination of clinical knowledge.
Conflicts-of-interest
restrictions may remove one source generating increased
distrust of the research enterprise, even though this distrust
may be misplaced. Conflicts-of-interest restrictions will not
fund post-marketing research, and may actually reduce current
resources if the risks of industry funding of post-approval trials
include criminal and civil prosecution; will not improve
physician learning, and appears to be reducing educational
opportunities as firms react to increased risks; and will not fill
the knowledge voids within which both doctors and regulators
currently practice.
Even if the financial relationships between prescribing
doctors and Parke-Davis were inappropriate and perhaps
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illegal, the existence of those relationships did not prove that
the off-label prescriptions were themselves inappropriate. Offlabel prescribing, even where clinical trials proving efficacy for
new indications have not yet begun or are not yet completed,
can bring great benefit to patients. Of course, such prescribing
can also subject patients to ineffective medications with the
attendant costs and risks. The real challenge is not detecting
and prosecuting the zealous marketing efforts of a Parke-Davis,
but rather it is assuring that patients get good care. Raising
the risks for pharmaceutical firms in funding Phase IV clinical
trials and continuing medical education will not get us there.
Nor will targeting off-label prescribing as if there were no risks
in doing so.

